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User-Generated Evidence
REBECCA

J. HAMILTON*

"Photographsfurnish evidence. Something we hear
about, but doubt, seems proven when we're shown a
photograph of it...
[T]he camera record incriminates."
-Susan Sontag'
Around the world, people are increasingly using their
smartphones to document atrocities. This Article is
the first to address the implications of this important
development for international criminal law. While
acknowledging the potential benefits such usergenerated evidence could have for internationalcriminal investigations, the Article identifies three categories of concern related to its use. (i) user security, (ii)
evidentiary bias, and (iii) fair trial rights. Without
adequate safeguards, user-generated evidence may
address current problems in international criminal
justice at the cost of creating new ones and shifting
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Lopez, Jen Daskal, Meg deGuzman, and from feedback received at the 2017 Mid-Atlantic
Junior Faculty Forum at Richmond Law School, the 2017 Women in International Law
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existing problems from traditional actors, who have
institutional support, to individual users without such
protections.
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INTRODUCTION

International criminal investigations are in trouble. Security
risks to investigators, limited access to sites of atrocity, and witness
intimidation have created evidentiary problems that have derailed
high-profile prosecutions of alleged war criminals. 2 In response,
there has been a steady rise in the outsourcing of investigations from
staff employed by international courts to private actors. 3 This Article
homes in on the most recent part of this trend-technologists and
criminal justice advocates coming together to encourage individuals
to collect what I term "user-generated evidence."
User-generated evidence is a sub-category of user-generated
content. Like other forms of user-generated content, user-generated
evidence is recorded on a device such as a smartphone by an ordinary
citizen, referred to here as a user. 4 Unlike most types of usergenerated content, however, user-generated evidence is recorded with
the intent to help achieve legal accountability for wrongdoing.5 Citizen recordings of police brutality provide6 an example with which
many Americans are increasingly familiar.
One of the consequences of the 2007 launch of Apple's iPhone, and the subsequent development of lower-cost alternatives, is
that millions of people around the world now carry cameras with
2. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Notice of Withdrawal of the
Charges Against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta,
1 3 (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_09939.PDF [https://perma.cc/PP7F-ZKYP].
3. For the first major law review article on this trend, see Elena Baylis, Outsourcing
Investigations, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 121 (2009).
4. Throughout this Article, I refer to the ordinary citizen who records footage for
evidentiary purposes as a (smartphone) "user" rather than as a "citizen" so as not to exclude
users who do not have citizenship in the places where they are recording or, indeed, are
stateless.
5. See Philipp Amann & Mark P. Dillon, Electronic Evidence Management at the
ICC: Legal, Technical, Investigative, and OrganizationalConsiderations,in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 231, 234 (Adejok6 Babington-Ashaye,
Aimge Comrie & Akingbolahan Adeniran eds., 2018) ("Simply put, evidence [as
distinguished from other electronic content] is information or intelligence that can be used in

court.").
6.

See, e.g., Catherine E. Shoichet & Randi Kaye, Michael Brown Shooting: Is New

Video a 'Game Changer'?, CNN (Sept. 12, 2014, 7:49 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/
1 1/us/ferguson-michael-brown-shooting-witnesses/index.html
[https://perma.cc/7GT8HJC4].
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them virtually 24/7. Much of the footage those cameras record gets
uploaded online. Type "Syria atrocities footage" into Google and
you will be overwhelmed with a visual library of inhumanity. You
will see photographs and shaky footage, recorded on the smartphones
7
of bystanders, showing acts worthy of criminal prosecution.
As further elaborated below, there are now freely available
smartphone applications ("apps") designed to enable individuals to
record footage that will satisfy the evidentiary standards of an international criminal courtroom. These user-generated evidence apps automatically (i) embed metadata from satellites, cell phone towers, and
surrounding wireless and Bluetooth devices into recordings and (ii)
record hash values as a check against subsequent manipulation.8 The
hope is that the footage filmed using these apps will be selfauthenticating.
In the best-case scenario, the user-generated evidence will be
admissible in international criminal trials without a user ever having
to be identified, let alone having to testify. 9 This would offer several
advantages that could transform the field of international criminal investigations:
(1) Compared to outside investigators, who typically reach
sites of atrocity months after the crimes have been committed, local
users can capture evidence immediately, thus preserving evidence
that might otherwise be lost or destroyed;
(2) Compared to traditional witnesses, who can be threatened,
intimidated, or manipulated, user-generated evidence-if properly
secured and verified-records testimony that cannot be changed or
recanted;
7. See, e.g., Neal Ungerleider, Syrians Upload Ramadan Massacre Footage onto
YouTube with Pen Cameras and Smuggled Tech, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 1, 2011),
https://www.fastcompany.com/1770731/syrians-upload-ramadan-massacre-footage-youtubepen-cameras-and-smuggled-tech [https://perma.cc/93T8-A2ND].
8. A hash value is generated by an algorithm "that maps data of an arbitrary length to
data of a fixed length." Amann & Dillon, supra note 5, at 237 n.12. This almost always
generates a unique value that can then be subsequently used to verify whether a file is
identical to its original form. Id. at 237.
9. See, e.g., FAQs: Organisation,EYEWITNESS [hereinafter eyeWitness Organisation
FAQs], http://www.eyewitnessproject.org [https://perma.cc/6XE3-L9W2] (click "FAQs"
link in upper right hand of page, then "Organisation," and then "Click for more Organisation
details") ("eyeWitness has commissioned extensive research into the admissibility of digital
evidence. While this is an evolving issue, a study of cases from international, regional, and
national courts shows that evidence must be relevant and reliable.... Reliability in relation
to photos or videos requires the date/time/location of the recording, assurance that the video
has not been altered, and assurance that the footage is the original version. The eyeWitness
app ensures all three.").
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(3) Reliance on user-generated evidence would reduce security risks to court investigators, since they would most likely make
fewer visits to sites of atrocities; and
(4) User-generated evidence could "democratize" evidence
collection by shifting the balance of control from outside professionals to local people.
One way to view the emergence of user-generated evidence is
as part of an ongoing process of technological development, stretching back to the late nineteenth century, in which advances in visual
documentation make their way into a courtroom setting: from the
daguerreotype, to the photograph, to the camcorder, to the cellphone
recording.
From a courtroom standpoint, this is a plausible way to
make sense of the advent of user-generated evidence and suggests
that much or all of what we need to know about user-generated evidence can be gleaned from existing principles of evidence. 11 This
Article, however, advances a different understanding-at least in relation to international criminal law. By widening the analytic time
frame from the moment of trial back into the investigative process, I
argue that the emergence of user-generated evidence in international
criminal investigations is the most visible sign yet of the fundamental
disruption underway within the investigatory ecosystem.
International criminal investigations have always drawn, to
some degree, on the work of third-parties, especially so-called firstresponder organizations. 12 But the field was traditionally dominated
by professional court-appointed investigators. Now, key aspects of
investigations
are increasingly undertaken by a range of private ac13
tors.
As a part of this trend-somewhat akin to the emergence of
10. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: PhotographicEvidence and the
Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 8 14 (1998).
11. This perspective will be familiar to those conversant with Judge Easterbrook's
"law of the horse" argument. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the
Horse, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207 10 (1996).
12.

U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS CTR, FIRST RESPONDERS:

AN

INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON COLLECTING AND ANALYZING EVIDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL

CRIMES 4 (2014) (describing NGOs as "first responder" organizations who "often arrive at
crime scenes long before court investigators, who may face diplomatic, legal, or pragmatic
obstacles to reaching atrocity sites").

13. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
ON THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC (Sept. 17, 2018, 12:29 PM), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentlnternationalCommission.aspx
[https://
perma.cc/Y75X-M3Q8]; Nick Robins-Early, Inside One Group's Mission to Bring Assad's
Regime to Justice, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 17, 2018, 12:41 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/entry/assad-war-crimes-cija-us_57led6e6e4bOf3O9baee63eO
[https://
perma.cc/7TFY-TC6Y] (describing the investigative work of the private non-profit group
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Uber or Airbnb with respect to taxis and hotels-user-generated evidence apps are enabling even more novel actors to enter the "market"
of international criminal investigations, challenging the taken-forgranted monopoly previously held by court-appointed investigators.
This trend raises thorny questions of ethics, safety, and accountability, which are the focus of this Article.

This Article is the first piece of legal scholarship to address
the introduction of user-generated evidence into international criminal law. 14 To the extent that others have written on the topic, they

have been either practitioners involved in the development of usergenerated evidence apps, those looking at digital or open-source evidence more generally, or journalists who cover technology. 15 Unsurprisingly, many of these accounts paint the emergence of usergenerated evidence in an overwhelmingly positive light. According
to Mark Ellis, Executive Director of the International Bar Association, which has facilitated the development of a user-generated evidence app, "[The] app will be a transformational tool ...providing a

solution to the evidentiary challenges surrounding mobile phone
footage."' 16 While I acknowledge all the potential advantages userthe Commission for International Justice and Accountability).
14. A comprehensive literature review reveals only one piece of legal scholarship that
touches on the use of user-generated evidence in international litigation. See Lindsay
Freeman, Digital Evidence and War Crimes Prosecutions: The Impact of Digital
Technologies on International Criminal Investigations and Trials, 41 FORDHAM J. INT'L L.
283 (2018) (describing the emergence of evidence derived from digital technology, such as
telecommunications intercepts and financial records of electronic funds transfers). Although
this is not the focus of her article, Freeman explains that in Prosecutorv. Al Mahdi, a war
crimes case at the ICC, the defense agreed to allow user-generated evidence in the form of
video footage into the record as part of their client's guilty plea. Id. at 314 20. As there was
no trial, the Court did not have to make any determinations regarding the evidence. Id. I am
working on a project that will extend beyond international criminal law to assess the extent
to which other international courts, tribunals, and adjudicatory forums are also starting to
rely on user-generated evidence. See Rebecca Hamilton, New Media Evidence Across
International Courts and Tribunals, in BEYOND FRAGMENTATION:

COMPETITION AND

COLLABORATION AMONG INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Chiara Giorgetti & Mark
A. Pollack eds.) (forthcoming 2019).
15. See, e.g., Kieran Guilbert, App Empowers Civilian to Capture Evidence of War
Crimes on Smartphones, REUTERS (June 7, 2015, 7:02 PM), http://www.reuters.
comarticle/warcrimes-apps-idUSL5NOYQ19J20150607
[https://perma.cc/Y96P-HXSP];
Rory Cellan-Jones, EyeWitness App Lets Smartphones Report War Crimes, BBC (June 8,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-33029464
[https://perma.cc/B96C-4YNV];
Alexa Koenig et al., Open Source Fact-Findingin PreliminaryExaminations, in 2 QUALITY
CONTROL IN PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 681 (Morten Bergsmo & Carsten Stahn eds., 2018),
http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6706c9/pdf/ [https://perma.cc/X389-C7LL].
16. Mark Ellis, quoted in Owen Bowcott, Eyewitness to Atrocities: The App Aimed at
Bringing War Criminals to Justice, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2015, 7:01 PM), https://www.
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generated evidence could bring to international criminal investigations, this Article cautions against any sense of inevitability that this
positive potential will be realized. 17
The admission of user-generated evidence into international
criminal litigation has already begun. An August 2017 arrest warrant
issued by the International Criminal Court for a Libyan national,
Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf al-Werfalli, marked the first time that an
international criminal court relied on user-generated footage, posted
to social media, to substantiate a criminal allegation-in this case, the
war crime of murder. is In reviewing video evidence presented by the
prosecution, the pre-trial chamber concluded there were "reasonable
grounds to believe" that al-Werfalli had committed or ordered the
killings recorded in the footage. 19
Although this Article focuses on international criminal litigation, it is worth noting that other international adjudicatory forums
are starting to receive this type of evidence as well. In 2017, Ukraine
presented user-generated evidence before the International Court of
Justice in its request for provisional measures against Russia.2 0 Similarly, the Permanent Court of Arbitration relied on user-generated evidence presented by the Netherlands in determining that Russia had
violated its obligations under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/08/eyewitness-to-atrocities-the-app-aimed-atbringing-war-criminals-to-justice [https://perma.cc/4M55-RXTZ].
17.

See generally EVGENY MOROZOv, To SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY

OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM (2013) (warning of the pitfalls of expecting technology to
unequivocally fix problems).
18. Prosecutor v. Al-Werfalli, ICC-01/11-01/17, Warrant of Arrest,
3 (Aug. 15,
2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_05031.PDF [https://perma.cc/D95RUNFF]. User-generated evidence entered the court record at the ICC one time prior to this,
in Prosecutor v. al-Mahdi. But in that case, the defense agreed to allow user-generated
video footage into the record as part of their client's guilty plea, which is a significantly
different process from an evidentiary perspective than what would transpire in a typical trial.
See Prosecutor v. al-Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment & Sentence,
2, 5 (Sept. 27,
2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_07244.PDF [https://perma.cc/FC37UXFJ].
19. "Reasonable grounds to believe" is the evidentiary standard that the Rome Statute
requires for the issuance of an arrest warrant. Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court art. 58, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544 [hereinafter Rome
Statute].
20. Terrorism Financing and Racial Discrimination in Ukraine, (Ukr. v. Russ.),
Application Instituting Proceedings, [53, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/166/
19314.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RJ5-2AQL].
Ukraine presented photographic and video
evidence from eyewitnesses to support its claim that Russia was violating Article 18 of the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism through the
transfer of weaponry that fostered, rather than prevented, terrorist activity. Id.
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Sea. 21 This phenomenon further reinforces the need to start addressing the implications of this important development in international
litigation.
Returning to the international criminal law context, however,
al-Werfalli remains at large.22 Until he is arrested and his trial is
convened, it is hard to predict whether the judges will find that the
video footage has sufficient evidentiary strength to proceed to trial.
But what does seem clear is that there is an urgent need to build our
understanding of what this emerging development will mean for the
range of actors involved in international criminal justice.
Although the international legal scholarship has been silent on
the topic of user-generated evidence, there are other bodies of literature-on domestic policing, 23 on visual bias, 24 and on the use of information and communications technologies for peacebuilding, human rights, and development25 -that provide material relevant to
analyzing the potential impact of user-generated evidence on international criminal investigations. Insights from these materials, when
applied to the user-generated evidence context, reveal several risks.
Unless these risks are carefully managed, any potential benefits from
the production of user-generated evidence will be acquired only at
the cost of creating new problems and/or shifting existing problems
from professional investigators onto users. In addition, the use of
this type of evidence raises challenges for lawyers and potential problems for defendants in cases that rely on user-generated evidence. In
sum, decisions made by key legal actors in the very near future will
be central to determining the impact of user-generated evidence on
21. The Court relied on video footage taken by Greenpeace in its judgment on the
merits ordering Russia to pay damages to the Netherlands for violations under articles 56(2),
58(1), 58(2), 87(1)(a), and 92(1) of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. There was
no discussion of the veracity of the videos and there was no submission by Russia, as it did
not participate in the proceedings. Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No. 2014-02,
Award on the Merits,
71 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), https://www.pcacases.com/
web/sendAttach/1438 [https://perma.cc/CPC9-5MG3]. See generally Hamilton, supra note
14 (providing a survey of instances in which international courts and tribunals have had new
media evidence, including user-generated evidence, brought before them).
22. Libyans Deserve Justice, as War Crime Suspects Remain at Large: Prosecutor,
UN NEWS (May 9, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/05/1009262 [https://perma.cc/
ZN6L-R2JQ].
23. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to
Record the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 1559 (2016).
24. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v.
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REv. 837 (2009).
25.

See, e.g., MOLLY LAND ET AL., #ICT4HR:

TECHNOLOGIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2012).

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
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international criminal investigations, and indeed on international
criminal justice writ large.
This Article proceeds as follows: After a brief history of the
use of visual evidence in court, Part I situates the emergence of usergenerated evidence within the context of the underlying challenges
facing international criminal investigations, and explains that to view
user-generated evidence as simply a new technology-enabled development misses a more fundamental shift that it brings to the investigatory ecosystem. Part II devotes significant space to the necessary
task of mapping out, for the first time, the new players that are entering the investigatory sphere thanks to the emergence of usergenerated evidence, and identifying the challenges that arise from the
interrelationships between them. Part III then walks through the
lifecycle of user-generated evidence, from collection and evaluation
to a trial and its aftermath. This part, the primary contribution of the
Article, further complicates the attractive idea that user-generated evidence can provide a solution to the many problems facing international criminal investigations. It identifies three categories of concern arising from the emergence of user-generated evidence: (i) user
security, (ii) evidentiary bias, and (iii) fair trial rights.
With two user-generated evidence apps currently in use, and
user-generated evidence already presented in an international arrest
26
warrant, the growth of user-generated evidence seems inevitable.
The question, then, is what are the options for addressing the concers identified? Recognizing that concerns about evidentiary bias
and fair trial rights are nothing new, Part IV begins by looking at
ways to mitigate security risks to users. Situating the new investigatory ecosystem within the context of the steady move toward the privatization of previously public functions, I explore the possibility of
regaining accountability through contract design, and assess the degree to which the ICC's Guidelines on the Use of Intermediaries and
the International Committee of the Red Cross's ("ICRC") Guidelines
for Protection Actors could be adapted to the user-generated evidence
context.
The Article concludes that while the concerns identified are
not necessarily fatal to the project of user-generated evidence, they

26. See About eyeWitness: Project Description, EYEWITNESS [hereinafter eyeWitness
Project Description], http://www.eyewitnessproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/NU5M-6BCC]
(click "About" link in upper right hand of page and then "Project Description"); CameraV
App and the InformaCam System, GUARDLAN PROJECT, https://guardianproject.
github.io/informacam-guide/en/InformacamGuide.htm
[https://perma.cc/H925-NBU3];
Prosecutor v. Al-Werfalli, JCC-01/11-01/17, Warrant of Arrest, 3 (Aug. 15, 2017), https://
www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_05031.PDF [https://perma.cc/M4QD-JF6V].

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[57:1

should, at minimum, give pause to those who see user-generated evidence as part of the solution to the problems currently facing international criminal investigations.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF USER-GENERATED EVIDENCE
The use of visual evidence in criminal investigations and
courtroom proceedings is nothing new. As Jennifer Mnookin recounts in The Image of Truth, photography was originally the province of experts, but, by the 1880s, technological advances and reductions in cost made photography accessible to ordinary people. 27 In
the criminal law context, this meant so-called roving amateurs could
now catch people "in the act," and by the turn of the century, photo2
graphs were commonplace in courtrooms across the United States. 8
When it came to moving images, U.S. courts began routinely
permitting the entry of film into evidence as far back as 1935.29 And
long before the emergence of smartphones, video evidence played a
high-profile role in the (unsuccessful) effort to prosecute officers of
the Los Angeles Police Department for the beating of black motorist
Rodney King.
Internationally, the story of film as evidence goes back to the
prosecution of Nazi atrocities at Nuremberg. U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Robert Jackson, who was U.S. Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, turned to the documentary film Nazi Concentration Camps to
establish "incredible events by credible evidence.", 31 And since then,
international and hybrid criminal courts have continued to make use
of video footage. 32

27.

See generally Mnookin, supra note 10.

28.

See id. at 12 13.

29.

See LOUIS-GEORGES SCHWARTZ, MECHANICAL WITNESS:

A HISTORY OF MOTION

PICTURE EVIDENCE IN U.S. COURTS 13 14 (2009).

30. See Forrest Stuart, Constructing Police Abuse after Rodney King: How Skid Row
Residents and the Los Angeles Police Department Contest Video Evidence, 36 L. &. Soc.
INQUIRY 327, 331 32 (2011) (describing defense counsel's ability to recast the footage as
justifiable police conduct).
31. Justice Robert Jackson, quoted in Lawrence Douglas, Film as Witness: Screening
Nazi ConcentrationCamps Before the Nuremberg Tribunal, 105 YALE L.J. 449, 452 (1995).
32. For video footage as evidence at the ICTY, see, e.g., Vladimir Petrovid, A Crack in
the Wall of Denial: The Scorpions Video in and out of the Courtroom, in NARRATIVES OF
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND BEYOND 93 108
(Dubravka Zarkov & Marlies Glasius eds., 2014). For the same at the ICC, see, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Transcript of Oral Session, 11 (Jan. 26,
JUSTICE IN AND OUT OF THE COURTROOM:
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Still, as recently as five years ago, the idea that an ordinary
citizen who witnessed an atrocity could use his or her smartphone to
anonymously make a direct evidentiary contribution to an international criminal prosecution was virtually unheard of. 33 For the International Criminal Court ("ICC") and its predecessor tribunals, like
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR"), it had long been assumed that evidence collection requires
some in-person contact. 34 With no police force to carry out investigative activities on their behalf, legal teams from these courts have
typically sent their own personnel into areas where crimes have allegedly occurred. 35 User-generated evidence disrupts this traditional
approach.3 6
The following section sets the stage for understanding the
emerging role of user-generated evidence in international criminal
investigations and trials. In popular accounts, advances in information and communications technology have driven the possibility of
user-generated evidence playing a role in international criminal investigations. 3 7 While not untrue, this explanation is incomplete.
2009),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Transcripts/CR2009_00591.PDF
[https://perma.cc/TS225VMH]. For the same at the various hybrid tribunals for Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and
Lebanon, see, e.g., Pedro Pizano, Court Views 1977 Video Footage of I" January Dam,
CAMBODIA TRIBUNAL MONITOR (May 26, 2015) http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/2015/
05/26/court-views-1977-video-footage-of- 1st-january-dam/ [https://perma.cc/44RD-RSK4]
(video footage at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia); Shocking
Footage at Taylor Trial, BBC NEWS (Jan. 7, 2008, 5:49 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/7174288.stm [https://perma.cc/B8LA-MLZ2 (video footage at the Special Court
for Sierra Leone).
33. Indeed, it was not until 2008 that the ICC even began to consider its capacity to
deal with digital evidence of any kind. See U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF L., HUM. RTS. CTR.,
DIGITAL FINGERPRINTS: USING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE TO ADVANCE PROSECUTIONS AT THE
INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 5
(2014), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC/
Digital fingerprints interior cover2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K74L-PVUA].

34.

See, e.g., INT'L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

INTERREGIONAL

CRIME AND

JUSTICE RESEARCH INST.,

ICTY

& U.N.

MANUAL ON DEVELOPED

PRACTICES 15 27 (2009), http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/
ICTYManual on DevelopedPractices.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN5S-GYP7] (discussing the
ICTY's "information gathering" techniques).
35. See About: Office of the Prosecutor, INT'L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/
about/otp [https://perma.cc/98TJ-TBSZ].
36. See U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., supra note 33, at 8
(discussing the decisions the Office of the Prosecutor will have to make as it strengthens its
ability to gather and analyze digital evidence, such as whether to train field investigators in
digital forensic techniques or hire specialized staff).
37.

See e.g., Bowcott, supra note 16.
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Specifically, it fails to account for non-technology-related factors that
have affected international criminal investigations over the past decade. This section describes the problems that have plagued international criminal investigations, and illustrates how the convergence of
several factors has led to the current moment, in which usergenerated evidence is being proactively advanced as part of the solution to the challenges of evidence collection.
A. Problems Facing InternationalCriminalInvestigations
International criminal investigations are never easy. The perpetrators of atrocities and their supporters have a strong interest in
hiding or destroying evidence of their crimes. 38 Unlike its predecessor tribunals, the ICC is often faced with the task of investigating
while crimes are still ongoing.3 9 In this context it has been disappointing, but not surprising, that the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor
("OTP") has struggled to develop a successful approach to its investigative work. As a result, a "lack of quality evidence" has hindered
40
the OTP's ability to secure convictions against alleged perpetrators.
In 2012, the Court acquitted Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, a warlord from the Democratic Republic of the Congo ("DRC"), whom the
41
OTP had charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The judges could not rule out the possibility that crimes had occurred, but concluded that the OTP had not provided sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ngudjolo was responsible.42
In a deposition about the challenges faced by the OTP's investigative team working in the DRC on another case, a former lead
investigator testified about conditions of immense insecurity on the
43
ground.
In addition to the general presence of armed groups, spe38. See, e.g., Implicating Humala: Evidence of Atrocities and Cover-Up of Abuses
Committed during Peru's Armed Conflict, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/07/implicating-humala/evidence-atrocities-and-coverabuses-committed-during-perus
[https://perma.cc/HF44-RCV8]
(describing
Former
President of Peru Ollanta Humala's direct participation in atrocities and his attempt to cover
up incriminating evidence during his electoral campaign for president ).
39. Situations Under Investigation, INT'L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/
situation.aspx [https://perma.cc/GPH9-WKKS].
40.

U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., supra note 33, at 3.

41. Prosecutor v. Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment,
7 (Dec. 12, 2012),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013-02993.PDF [https://perma.cc/Z2T2-XC5T].
42.

Id.

110, 456, 499, 503, 516.

43.

Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Deposition of Witness DRC-
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cific threats were made against the ICC investigators, who stood out
as foreigners among the local population. 44 Even more problematic
were the security threats against anyone thought to be cooperating
with the ICC investigators.45 As a result, potential witnesses were
put at risk, and relative to these security concerns, "the work of investigating itself almost became secondary. 4 6
The effort to prosecute those responsible for crimes committed during Kenya's post-election violence in 2007-2008 epitomizes
the way in which evidentiary problems have been hindering the
OTP's ability to secure convictions. In 2014, the OTP announced it
would have to abandon its charges against President Uhuru Kenyatta,
due to insufficient evidence. 4 7 Threats and intimidation had led seventeen of the prosecution's witnesses to change their minds about testifying against the accused.4 8
As problematic as the investigations in the DRC and Kenya
have been, they at least involved OTP personnel reaching the crime
scenes. By contrast, OTP staff have never investigated in Darfur,
Sudan-the site of the first situation that the United Nations Security
Council referred to them for investigation. 49 ICC personnel and anyOTP-WWWW-0582, 34-40 (Nov. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Lubanga Witness Deposition],
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Transcripts/CR2012 00069.pdf [https://perma.cc/M35L-8K25].
44. Id. at 37 38. But see Situation in Darfur, Case No. ICC-02/05, Observations of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights invited in Application of Rule 103 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, [75 (Oct. 10, 2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
CourtRecords/CR2007_02013.PDF [https://perma.cc/7JPY-Y8HG] (stating that, in the High
Commissioner's view, the obligation of the Government of Sudan to allow "unfettered
access for exhaustive investigations" should have made it possible to send ICC investigators
into Darfur).
45.

Lubanga Witness Deposition, supra note 43, at 39.

46.

Id.

47. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Withdrawal of
Charges,
4 (Mar. 13, 2015) https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_02842
[https://perma.cc/7XDW-4LUA]; cf Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang, Case No. ICC-09/09-01/1 1,
Decision of Application for Judgments of Acquittal, 464 (Apr. 5, 2016) https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04384.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WX66-XQ2K].
See also
Bowcott, supranote 16.
48. See Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang, Case No. ICC-09/09-01/11, Statement of the
Prosecutor Regarding Trial Chamber's Decision to Vacate Charges Against Messrs William
Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang Without Prejudice to Their Prosecution in the Future,
(Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-160406
[http://
perma.cc/5WVG-L47A].
49. See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05, Prosecutor's Response to
Cassese's Observation on Issues Concerning the Protection of Victims and the Preservation
of Evidence in the Proceedings on Darfur Pending before the ICC,
16 (Sept. 11, 2016)
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007-02009.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5X7-WZBF].
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one suspected of being associated with 5 them have been threatened
with death by the Sudanese government. 0
As the length of time between the commission of a crime and
the collection of evidence grows, so does the likelihood of evidence
being lost or destroyed. Even in situations where access has not been
outright impossible, such as the OTP's investigation in Libya, OTP
personnel have been delayed in reaching crimes scenes. 5 1 And, of
course, the universe of atrocities deserving prosecution extends beyond situations over which the ICC has jurisdiction.
The OTP's first effort to overcome the investigatory challenges of security threats to its staff and potential witnesses, witness
intimidation, and the problems of access to areas of ongoing conflict
52
involved it turning to so-called "intermediaries" for assistance.
These intermediaries were local activists on whom OTP investigators
began to rely to reach out to potential witnesses. As locals of the area, the intermediaries attracted less attention than investigative teams
from the Hague, thus reducing the security risks to the potential witnesses with whom they came in contact.5 3 And because intermediaries were already onsite, their use overcame the access problems faced
by OTP personnel.
While the idea of outsourcing some of the OTP's investigative functions to local actors was attractive in theory, it rapidly backfired in practice. 55 On the opening day of the ICC's first-ever trial, a
50. Prosecutor v. Harun & Kushayb, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Public Redacted
Version of Prosecution Request for a Finding on the Non-Cooperation of the Government of
the Sudan,
33 36 (Apr. 19, 2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR201002788.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2QJ-XUS4].
51. See Caroline Buisman, Delegating Investigations: Lessons to be Learnedfrom the
Lubanga Judgment, Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 30, 53 n.207 (2013) (describing a one-month
delay after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime before OTP staff set foot in Libya).
52.

Lubanga Witness Deposition, supra note 43, at 53 54.

53.

See OPEN SOC'Y JUST. INITIATIVE, BRIEFING PAPER:

WITNESS INTERFERENCE IN

CASES BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2 6 (2016), https://www.
opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/factsheet-icc-witness-interference-20 161116.
pdf [https://perma.cc/DD5A-UZRR].

54. See Lubanga Witness Deposition, supra note 43, at 48 ("[T]here was an advantage,
a massive advantage, with them [the intermediaries] compared to us [the OTP staff], and this
was that they were really implanted in the population.").
55.

See generally Baylis, supra note 3.

INVESTIGATIVE

MANAGEMENT,

STRATEGIES,

AND

See also WAR CRIMES RES. OFFICE,
TECHNIQUES

OF THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT'S OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 8 9 (2012), https://www.wcl.american.edu/

impact/initiatives-programs/warcrimes/our-projects/icc-legal-analysis-and-education-project
reports/report- 16-investigative-management-strategies-and-techniques-of-the-internationalcriminal-courts-office-of-the-prosecutor/ [https://perma.cc/EE2R-3JJJ].
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former child soldier recanted his testimony against accused Congolese warlord Thomas Lubanga. The witness told the court that someone from a local organization-one of the intermediaries used by the
OTP-had manipulated him into testifying. 56 Over the course of the
trial, several other witnesses told the court that intermediaries had
promised them the opportunity
to earn money and to study in ex57
change for false testimony. Although Lubanga was ultimately convicted, it was not on the basis of the testimony of any of the former
child soldiers that the OTP put on the stand. Finding that none of the
testimony of these witnesses could be relied upon, the court concluded that "the prosecution should not have delegated its investigative
responsibilities to the intermediaries ... notwithstanding the exten-

sive security difficulties it faced. ' , 58 A 2013 report by the International Bar Association ("IBA") concluded that the ICC's reliance on
in-court witness
' 59 testimony "may be unsustainable due to a number of
challenges."
B. User-GeneratedEvidence as Partof the Solution

As the flaws in traditional approaches to evidence collection
were put on display in the Hague, the expansion of information and
communications technology ("ICT") was already well underway.
The rapid evolution of modern technology ensured that long-standing
financial and non-monetary barriers to the creation of content, including through photography and video recording, by ordinary people
were falling away. 6 As people began to carry their smartphones
everywhere with them, not only was there no need to buy a camera,
there was also no need to plan in advance of taking a photo or video. 61

56.

Witness Recants in Congo War-Crimes Trial, NBC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2009, 2:47

PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/28891559/ns/world-news-africa/t/witness-recants-congowar-crimes-trial/#.WT8mLU0rL [https://perma.cc/G3JM-26P7].
57. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment,
178 (Mar. 14,
2012),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl379838.pdfCourtRecords/CR2012_03942.
pdf [https://perma.cc/E3NY-RH6G].
58.

Id.

482.

59.

INT'L BAR Ass'N, WITNESSES BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

20

(2013),
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=9c4f533d-192742 lb-8c 12-d41768ffc 11 f [https://perma.cc/B5JM-A-ETA].
60. See Ella McPherson, Advocacy Organizations' Evaluation of Social Media
Information for INGO Journalism: The Evidence and Engagement Models, 59 AM. BEHAV.
Sci. 124, 128 (2015).
61.

This facilitated the move from the premeditated taking of images to what Professor
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Crucially, from the perspective of international criminal prosecutions, ICT expansion took place on a global scale. By 2016,
eighty-four percent of the population worldwide was covered by a
broadband mobile network, and by the end of632016, there were over
730 million unique SIM connections in Africa.
Human rights researchers became attuned to the impact of the
global ICT expansion in the context of the crisis in Syria. International non-governmental organizations ("INGOs") had difficult' getting their researchers into Syria following the 2011 uprising.
Despite the difficulty, they began to see an enormous amount of atrocity5
footage, captured by ordinary Syrians and uploaded to social media.
From an evidentiary perspective, however, the material was largely
unusable; there was usually no wa 6y of verifying the authenticity of
the images that had been uploaded.
The Syria situation is but one example of the more general
expansion of user-generated content being uploaded to social media,
and a range of actors from fields including journalism and social entrepreneurship have already begun to develop models to utilize that
content. Technology entrepreneurs in Kenya drew user-generated
content into a platform for mapping the 2007-2008 post-election vio67
lence.
A U.K. bloggercontent
formedforBellingcat,
a groupinto
dedicated
harnessing user-generated
investigations
subjectstorang-

Seth Kreimer describes as "pervasive image capture." Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image
Capture and the FirstAmendment: Memory, Disclosure, and the Right to Record, 159 U.
PA. L. REv. 335, 339-40 (2011). See also Okabe Daisuke, Camera Phones Changing the
Fefinition of Picture-Eorthy, JAPAN MEDIA REv. (Aug. 29, 2003), http://www.dourish.com/
classes/ics234cw04/ito3.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ6U-27G8] (discussing the ubiquity of
image capture on cellphones).
62. See INT'L TELECOMM. UNION, ICT FACTS AND FIGURES 2016 (2016),
https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures20l6.pdf
[https://

perma.cc/VAP2-3J47].
63.
2017),

Over Half a Billion Mobile Subscribers in Africa by 2020, AFRICA NEWS (July 25,
http://www.africanews.com/2017/07/25/over-half-a-billion-mobile-subscribers-in-

africa-by-2020-hi-tech/ [https://perma.cc/WX6E-PR4M].
64.

See SYRIA NEEDS ANALYSIS PROJECT, RELIEF ACTORS IN SYRIA 1 12 (Dec. 2013),

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/relief-actors
perma.cc/AC3Q-37PR].

in syria.pdf

[https://

65. See Maha Abu Shama, quoted in Ella McPherson, Advocacy Organizations'
Evaluation of Social Media Information for NGO Journalism:
The Evidence and
Engagement Models, 59 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 124, 125 (2015).
66.

See id. at 133 34.

67. About Ushahidi, USHAHIDI, https://www.ushahidi.com/about/
C2LW-2F3C].
68.

About, BELLINGCAT, https://www.bellingcat.com/about/

[https://perma.cc/

[https://perma.cc/6GH2-
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ing from Mexican drug cartels 69 to the MH- 17 plane crash. 70 The
Carter Center relied on crowdsourcing to try to verify instances of
violence in Syria. 7 1 And the Syria Justice and Accountability Center
sought to triangulate footage coming in from a range of open
72
sources.
It was during this global ICT expansion, as INGOs started observing the proliferation of user-generated content and began to
grapple with how to verify it, that the possibility of user-generated
evidence began to arise. Lawyers wondered whether the information
needed to authenticate a recording could be embedded within an
"app" that would thereby serve as a one-stop technical solution to the
73
verification problem.
And in 2011, the first effort 74to develop an
app that would capture user-generated evidence began.
As mentioned in the Introduction, there are presently two
apps that have been designed with the specific goal of gathering usergenerated evidence for international criminal prosecutions. 75 The
eyeWitness to Atrocities app was designed by commercial technolo-

PTPN].
69. Geolocating Mexican Sicarios in Chihuahua, BELLINGCAT (Feb. 25, 2016),
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2016/02/25/geolocating-mexican-sicarios-inchihuahua/ [https://perma.cc/DS6T-KV2D].
70. Russian Colonel General Identified as Key MH17 Figure, BELLINGCAT (Dec. 8,
2017), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/12/08/russian-colonel-generaldelfin/ [https://perma.cc/KR5U-HNWL].
71. CARTER CTR., Syria Conflict Resolution, https://www.cartercenter.org/peace/
conflict resolution/syria-conflict-resolution.html [https://perma.cc/YV7562N3].
72. E-mail from Mohammad Al Abdallah, Exec. Dir., Syria Justice & Accountability
Ctr., to Deyaa Alrwishdi, Research Assistant, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law (June 5, 2017,
10:01 AM EST) (on file with the Columbia Journalof TransnationalLaw).
73. See Mark S. Ellis, Shifting the Paradigm-Bringingto Justice Those Who Commit
Human Rights Atrocities, 47 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 265, 269 70 (2015) (describing how
the question of whether an app could be designed to address verification concerns in the
context of a mass of unverifiable user-generated content arose initially in relation to footage
out of Sri Lanka that could not be independently verified).
74. Initially, WITNESS and the IBA worked together on app development. At a later
point, however, the IBA decided that their goal of "court-level evidence from high-risk
environments" was more niche than what WITNESS was trying to develop, and so the two
organizations parted ways. See Interview with Wendy Betts, Director of the eyeWitness to
Atrocities Program at the Int'l Bar Ass'n (July 6, 2017) (on file with the Columbia Journal
of TransnationalLaw).
75. Domestically, the ACLU has designed an app specifically for user-generated
evidence collection in cases of police brutality. See Apps to Record Police Misconduct, AM.
CivL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-law-reform/reforming-policepractices/aclu-apps-record-police-conduct [https://perma.cc/B57HTDER].
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gists hired by the IBA, following consultations with lawyers at the
ICC and other international and hybrid tribunals. 76 The app, which
can be downloaded for free from Google Play, offers users anonymity by connecting verification of uploaded images to the phone itself
rather than to any user associated with the phone. 77 Everything a user records while inside the app is automatically tagged and encrypted,
with a hash value of the7pixel count recorded as a marker against
subsequent manipulation.
Vast amounts of metadata, including GPS coordinates, light
meter readings, and nearby cell tower signals are recorded to enable
the location and time of the footage to be verified. 79 Any new material is automatically encrypted, and once a user has finished filming,
they can upload their material through a secure transmission system
to the IBA for the purpose of providing evidence to international
criminal prosecutions.
Evidence sent through to the IBA is stored
in a "secure evidence locker" housed in London, where teams of pro
bono lawyers, commissioned by the IBA, catalogue the material,
hoping to make it useful to a criminal investigation.
The other app that has been developed specifically for usergenerated evidence collection in high-risk settings, although not with
international criminal prosecutions exclusively in mind, is CameraV. 82 CameraVis also available at no cost from Google Play and is a
joint project of the long-time video advocacy organization
WITNESS 83 and a software technology group known as the Guardian
Project, 84 with funding from Benetech, a California-based technology

76.

See Bowcott, supra note 16.

77. See Ellis, supra note 73, at 270 71 (describing the process involved in verifying
footage on an anonymous basis).
78.

See id. at 273 (describing the process of tagging and pixel count recording).

79.

See eyeWitness Project Description, supra note 26.

80. Id.
81. See Ellis, supra note 73, at 276 (explaining that a team of lawyers in London is
responsible for reviewing the incoming footage).
82. According to the CameraV user manual, the "V" stands for "Verification, Veritas
(Truth!) and Vaulted (secured!) [sic]." It also evokes the "V" hand sign for victory and
t
peace. Trust (But Verify
) What Your Eyes See, CAMERAV APP & THE INFORMACAM
SYSTEM,
https://guardianproject.github.io/informacam-guide/en/InformacamGuide.html
[https://perma.cc/2D2N-6GCC] (CameraV is a project of InformaCam platform).
83. About WITNESS, WITNESS, https://witness.org/aboutl [https://perma.cc/5TGUQSZ7] (WITNESS has focused on video advocacy since its founding in 1992).
84.

About the Guardian Project, GUARDIAN PROJECT, https://guardianproject.info/

[https://perma.cc/29B3-JZ9T].
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company. 85 As the precursor to the eyeWitness app, it shares many
of the same features, with vast amounts of metadata automatically
saved in order to help address concerns about authenticity when the
footage reaches
a courtroom, be that inside or outside the country that
86
the user is in.
WITNESS is fairly conservative in their description of Cam87
eraV as a tool that will "help to authenticate what users document."
The IBA is more declarative. As their introductory video to the eyeWitness app explains:
As an initiative of the International Bar Association,
we know the legal requirements for photos and videos
to be admitted as evidence in court. Recognizing the
immense risks eyewitnesses take we believe these efforts should never be in vain and potential evidence
88
should always be admissible in a court of law.
The IBA and WITNESS differ somewhat in the degree to which they
make assurances about user anonymity as a means of risk reduction,
though a technical feature of both eyeWitness and CameraV is that
they offer a built-in anonymity option by creating a unique hash value identifier connected to the phone rather than to the user. 89
CameraV requires an email address from those who upload
footage. But without any identifying information about the user recording the footage, there is no check on the veracity of the email address provided. 9
With the eyeWitness app, users can opt-in to
providing a contact email when they submit footage to the IBA, but it

85. The Benetech Story, BENETECH, https://benetech.org/about/
W829-J3UY].

[https://perma.cc/

86. See Harlo Holmes, Making Cameras Count, YouTUBE (Oct. 24, 2013), https://
(describing
www.youtube.com/watch?v=lzjoAdhAKWU
[https://perma.cc/4SJ2-SZX2]
encryption and metadata features that enable authentication). See also Interview with Sam
Gregory, WITNESS Program Director (July 18, 2017) (on file with the Columbia Journal of
TransnationalLaw) (explaining that the goal of CameraV was to enable users to record
evidence that could hopefully withstand authentication requirements in a courtroom, but not
making any predetermination about whether that would be an international courtroom like
the ICC or a courtroom in the user's locale).
87.

Interview with Gregory, supra note 86.

88. Int'l Bar Ass'n, Eyewitness V2 English Subbed, VIMEO (June 15, 2017), https://
vimeo.com/221239794.https://vimeo.com/221239794 [https://perma.cc/QM89-W9E6]. The
CameraV user manual states that footage recorded on the app is "more likely to be
admissible in a court of law." CAMERAV APP AND THE INFORMACAM SYSTEM, supra note 82.
89.

See Holmes, supra note 86; Ellis, supra note 73, at 273.

90.

See CAMERAV APP AND THE INFORMACAM SYSTEM, supra note 82.
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is not required. 9 1 The eyeWitness manual warns users who decide to
submit contact information that such information "could be helpful to
future investigations, but the user must understand that this information could potentially be turned over to all parties to a legal
case. ' 92 However, it also assures those choosing to film anonymously that "[w]e do not collect any information about your device that
could personally identify you as the user." 93 In the words of IBA
Executive Director Mark Ellis, "We never have to know who 'you
4
are.... We allow that to be a decision that you make and not us."
In addition to potentially addressing the problems of traditional evidence collection, such as investigator access, evidence destruction, and witness intimidation, user-generated evidence also presents the possibility of mitigating another key critique of
international criminal law-namely, that it has a neo-colonialist
agenda.95 As the leaders of African nations have increasinglyv pointed out, every defendant ever charged by the ICC is African.
And,
even though African nations were the court's earliest supporters, the
narrative that subsequently gained prominence is that the ICC has an
anti-Africa bias and is imposing an imperialist agenda on the least
powerful people on the planet.
The sight of Western investigators
91. See FAQs: Using the App, EYEWITNESS [hereinafter eyeWitness User FAQs],
http://www.eyewitnessproject.org [https://perma.cc/6XE3-L9W2] (click "FAQs" link in
upper right hand of page, then "Using the App," and then "Click for more details on using
the app").
92.

See id.

93.

See id.

94. Ellis, supra note 73, at 278. Both eyeWitness and CameraV were designed before
the EU introduced the General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR"). An analysis of the
potential implications of the GDPR for data gathered through these apps would be an
interesting consideration for future research.
95. See, e.g., George Monbiot, Imperialism Didn't End. These Days It's Known as
International Law, GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2012, 3:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2012/apr/30/imperialism-didnt-end-international-law
[https://perma.cc/
6XNG-89TY]. But see Douglas Smith, The International CriminalCourt: The Long Arm of
Neocolonialism?, INT'L AFF. REv. (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/87
[https://perma.cc/WMV7-BR5E] (arguing that with respect to the ICC, its prosecutorial
decisions are driven not by a neo-colonialist agenda, but by the need for political survival).
See generally DAVID Bosco, ROUGH JUSTICE (2013).
96. Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Jan. 4, 2014, 3:22 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/14/africa-attacksinternational-criminal-court [https://perma.cc/tJPG9=PRZP].
97. See Rebecca Hamilton, The ICC, the African Union, and the UN Security Council
Narratives and Counter-Narratives, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (Margaret deGuzman & Valerie Oosterveld eds.) (forthcoming). Of
course, the critique was simply the latest iteration of a long-standing critique of international
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flying in from the Hague to gather evidence from people across Africa and then flying straight out again only furthers the perception of
international criminal investigations as an "extractive industry."' 98 By
contrast, if people in remote and conflict-ridden regions could use
their phones to proactively send evidence to the ICC, then a bottomup narrative of international justice might begin to take hold. Rather
than being merely the subjects of an internationally-driven justice
agenda, people in conflict-ridden locations could help to direct the
focus and scope of international criminal investigations.
The convergence of the expansion of ICT, the beginnings of
evidence- specific app design, the increasingly visible problems of
traditional evidence collection, and the need to respond to the growing critique of international justice as a top-down imperialist project
soon drew the attention of philanthropic organizations interested in
strengthening international criminal justice. In October 2013, a major workshop drew together funders to discuss how to "improve the
capacity of investigators and prosecutors to gather and analyze digital
evidence relevant to serious international crimes." 99 One of the key
recommendations from the workshop was that the OTP partner with
technology companies and INGOs with expertise in digital material. 100

With both technical and financial pieces in place, the IBA and
WITNESS began outreach to get people in conflict-affected communities to download eyeWitness and CameraV, and to use the apps to
secure user-generated evidence. Over 5,000 users have downloaded
the eyeWitness app. And as of July 2017, the IBA had received 1,200
pieces of footage, translating into some seventy hours of potential evidence.101 Over 10,000 users have downloaded CameraV.102 And
law's imperialist tendencies.
See, e.g., U.O. UMOZURIKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COLONIALISM IN AFRICA (1979), cited in James T. Gathii, Africa, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 407, 420 (Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters eds.,
2013) ("[I]nternational law was used to facilitate or acquiesce in the imposition of [the slave
trade and colonialism].").
98. Dustin N. Sharp, Human Rights Fact-Finding and the Reproduction of
Hierarchies, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING 69, 78 (Philip
Alston & Sarah Knuckey eds., 2016) (explaining that the term "extractive industry" is used
by some critics of human rights fact-finding missions led by INGOs from the Global North).
99. U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF LA, HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., supra note 33, at 1. The
workshop was funded by Humanity United, Open Society Justice Initiative, Open Society
Foundations, Sigrid Rausing Trust, and the Oak Foundation.
100.

Id. at l1.

101.

See Interview with Betts, supra note 74.

102. E-mail from Sam Gregory, Program Director, WITNESS, to author (July 21, 2017
14:41 EDT) (on file with the Columbia Journal of TransnationalLaw). With respect to
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still many more users have filmed, and will continue to film, atrocities they witness, even in the absence of an evidence app.
It is not hard to see why the promise of user-generated evidence is attractive. The collection of evidence by local users raises
the possibility of displacing Hague-based investigators as the virtually exclusive collectors of evidence for international criminal investigations. This has the potential to be a collective win: the engagement of local users shifts investigations from a top-down to a bottomup approach, and Hague-based investigators are able to access evidence more quickly and with significantly less security risks to themselves and those they contact. In addition, the involvement of technologists opens up international criminal investigations to a whole
new field of expertise, which has the potential to reduce the traditional reliance of courtrooms on eyewitness testimony-and all the problems associated with it. 10 3 While no one is suggesting that usergenerated evidence could serve as a full replacement for evidence
gathered in more traditional ways, its appeal as a means of buttressing other evidence is clear. At its best, user-generated evidence
promises to provide a form of visual and oral testimony that (i) is secured in real-time, thereby removing the opportunity for evidence to
be lost or destroyed;10 4 (ii) is not subject to manipulation; and (iii)
can be obtained with potentially zero risk to ICC investigators and
the witnesses they would otherwise contact.
II. MAPPING THE NEW INVESTIGATORY SPACE
User-generated evidence necessitates a host of new actorsor existing actors in new roles-to join the investigatory ecosystem.
Neither the ICC nor any other international accountability mechanism can do all the work required to put user-generated evidence to
use.l10 A share of the work must be outsourced. And, as in any eco-

CameraV, user footage is not gathered in a centralized location, so there is no data on the
extent to which users have recorded on the app. Interview with Gregory, supra note 86.
103. See e.g., David A. Sonenshein & Robin Nilon, Eyewitness Errors and Wrongful
Convictions: Let's Give Science a Chance, 89 OR. L. REV. 263 (2010).
104.

See KELLY MATHESON, WITNESS, VIDEO AS EVIDENCE FIELD GUIDE 5 (2016) ("In

many situations, citizens and on-the-ground human rights activists and advocates are better
positioned to collect evidence of human rights abuse than professional investigators because
investigators almost always arrive after-the-fact when evidence has deteriorated or is
gone.").
105.

U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., supra note 33, at 7 (noting that

the court does not have the capacity to handle cutting-edge technological developments).
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system, the introduction of new actors affects the dynamics in play
across the entire investigatory field. Lines of authority and responsibility are "obscure[d] and fragment[ed]" as decision-making is distributed among the new mix of actors in the space.106
The emergence of user-generated evidence necessitates the
introduction of four groups of actors into the sphere of international
criminal investigations. First, there are the evidence-focused INGOs
who have pushed for the production of user-generated evidence. In
addition to overseeing the development of user-generated evidence
apps, they are also responsible for the outreach and training required
for the technology to be adopted in conflict- affected regions. Lacking the technical expertise to design the apps themselves, these INGOs have partnered with another set of actors, technologists. The
technologists who have been drawn into the investigatory space do
not have a background in international criminal justice, but they do
have the skills required to translate evidentiary requirements into app
design. The next group of new actors is the users who witness atrocities and record what they are seeing. And finally, the fourth group is
the private lawyers who take on the roles of cataloguing, coordinating, and potentially curating incoming user-generated evidence.
The following section maps out the roles played by each of
the four groups brought into the investigative space by the emergence
of user-generated evidence and begins to discuss some of the challenges they face in their interactions, both with each other and with
courts that may rely on user-generated evidence.
A. Evidence-FocusedINGOs
The presence of INGOs in the investigatory ecosystem is
nothing new. International investigators are unlikely to be the first
people to arrive on the scene when atrocities occur. The so-called
"first responders" from the international community are instead the
human rights, humanitarian, and protection organizations that are already working in the locale or nearby. 107 Material gathered by human rights organizations has been used in international criminal investigations since the start of the contemporary era of international

106. See Molly Land & Jay D. Aronson, The Promise and Peril of Human Rights
Technologies, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 1, 11 (Molly
Land & Jay D. Aronson eds., 2018).
Although Land and Aronson describe the
fragmentation of authority in relation to user-generated content more generally, the same
concerns apply specifically to user-generated evidence.
107.

See U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., supra note 12, at 4.
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criminal trials. 108 What is new here is the recent decision by the IBA
and WITNESS to focus on the collection of materials specifically intended, from the pre-collection stage forward, to end up in a court-

room.
1. Local Outreach by Evidence-Focused INGOs
The entry of these evidence-focused INGOs into the investigative space began with their involvement in the creation of usergenerated evidence apps. But it did not end there. Both WITNESS
and the IBA readily understood that fostering the creation of user-

generated apps alone would not be enough to bring in useful evidence. People in conflict-affected areas must first be encouraged to
download the apps, and then trained on how to use them. It is this

outreach to local populations, perhaps even more than the design features of the apps themselves, that will determine whether usergenerated evidence is admitted into an international criminal trial.
A key challenge in getting people who have downloaded
eyeWitness or CameraV to record useful content is to educate them

on the often counter-intuitive types of evidence needed to build a
criminal case. 109 In most atrocity situations, there is little doubt that

a crime of some kind has occurred. The investigatory challenge is to
108. Human rights reporting by INGOs and international organizations have been relied
upon by: the ICTY, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-8/2-T, Judgment,
50 51 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/tolmir/tjug/en/121212.pdf [https://perma.cc/48XM-X7WP] (relying on documentation
from Physicians for Human Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross);
ICTR, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Setako, Case No. ICTR-04-081-T, Judgment and Sentence,
[164 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Feb. 25, 2010), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/
unicr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-04-81/trial-judgements/en/100225.pdf
[https://perma.
cc/4FKW-BCX2] (entering a report by Committee for the Respect of Human Rights and
Democracy in Rwanda into evidence after receiving information on its provenance); ICC,
see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ongewen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Decision on Prosecution's Request to
Submit 1006 Items of Evidence,
41-42 (Jan 16, 2017), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
CourtRecords/CR2017_01740.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG3A-KEZP] (requesting to enter
documentation from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch); and the various
hybrid tribunals, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgement of the
Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, 55 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone Oct.
9,
2007),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/CDF/796/SCSL-04-14-T-796.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EV8X-B7UY] (relying on documentation from the International
Committee of the Red Cross). It should be noted, however, that the degree to which courts
have accepted third-party evidence has varied based on the stage of the trial proceeding. See
infra Part III.C.I.
109.

See generally DAVID CRUMP
(2d ed. 2010).

LAWYERING STRATEGIES

ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW:

CASES, STATUTES, AND
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gather evidence linking the crime to the person or people responsible
(so-called "linkage evidence").' 10 Most people with a smartphone in
hand during or after the commission of atrocities will point it in the
direction of hanned individuals, dead bodies, or destroyed infrastructure.11 1 But this sort of footage does not help investigators establish
who is responsible for the suffering captured on film.r12 By contrast,
images such as the insignia on soldier uniforms, or communications
and transportation equipment, can be invaluable in establishing a
chain of responsibility.
To this end, WITNESS produced a 200-page field guide, entitled Video as Evidence, which it uses to train groups and individuals
who may witness crimes. 114 The field guide uses both text and illustrations to explain basic concepts central to law and evidence, provide pragmatic advice on how to capture useful evidence, and
115 raise
some of the safety and ethical challenges involved in filming.
The IBA has also produced training materials, although the
focus of these materials is primarily on illustrating how to use the
eyeWitness app itself. 116 More significantly, the IBA has run an extensive outreach program. In addition to disseminating information
about the eyeWitness app through traditional media, the IBA has used
social media to alert users who are already recording crimes to the
110.

INT'L BAR ASS'N, EVIDENCE MATTERS IN ICC TRIALS 35 36 (2016) (describing

linkage evidence as that which establishes "a relationship between the crimes and the
criminal responsibility of an accused" and emphasizing its importance in criminal
proceedings). The value of linkage evidence is obviously also high in the domestic context.
See Smart, supra note 30, at 338-40 (presenting comparative case study on the impact of
video evidence of police criminality taken by a community watchdog group, finding that
video containing linkage evidence was more effective than video without such evidence).
111. See, e.g., Nadia Sayej, War Zone via Smartphone: The Syria Mobile Film Festival,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/film/2016/apr/08/syrian-mobilefilm-festival-berlin-films-shot-on-smartphones [https://perma.cc/7K6N-BSUW].
112.

See Jay D. Aronson, The Utility of User Generated Content in Human Rights

Investigations, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 129, 131

(Molly Land & Jay D. Aronson eds., 2018) (explaining how most footage captured by
citizens shows evidence that a crime occurred, not evidence of who might be responsible).
113. See Alison Cole, Picturesof Atrocity: Turning Video Footage into Evidence of War
Crimes EMERGENCY JOURNALISM (Mar. 14, 2014), http://emergencyjournalism.net/picturesof-atrocity-turning-video-footage-into-evidence-of-war-crimes/
[https://perma.cc/DKQ4J9WM]. See also MATHESON, supra note 104, at 42.
114.

MATHESON, supranote 104.

115.

Id.

116. See, e.g., EYEWITNESS, THE HOW To INFo-BOOKLET (2017), http://www.
eyewitnessproject.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/How-To-Info-Booklet-lores.pdf [https://perma.cc/XYK9-9B2T].
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availability of the app, and it has also done in-person outreach to local human rights groups in conflict-affected areas in Syria, Kenya,
and South Sudan. R7 Overall, then, to make user-generated evidence
actually useful to an investigatory team, a significant degree of INGO
involvement is required.
2. Complications Flowing from Local Outreach
INGO engagement with local populations raises complex
questions of accountability. And as has been thoroughly discussed in
the literature, INGOs based in the Global North, yet working primarily with populations in the Global South, face a range of stakeholders
with potentially conflicting objectives to satisfy. 118
For an organization whose goal is to secure user-generated
evidence, it is not obvious how to balance, for instance, values of
empowerment and autonomy for users who want to retain control
over what they document and where that footage goes, with the goal
of getting footage that will be most useful for criminal proceedings
quickly into the hands of an investigative team. Even at this nascent
stage, the two main organizations involved in the production of usergenerated evidence have taken divergent paths on this issue. Users of
the eyeWitness app must, per the design of the app, send their footage
to the IBA in London before they send it anywhere else for the purposes of sharing or storage. 119 While this reduces the control users
have over their footage, the IBA views this as crucial to their ability
to vouch for the authenticity of the evidence. 120 The design of CameraV, by contrast, offers users unlimited flexibility to decide whether
or where to share or store the footage they record. "We don't want to
make assumptions about who is the right entity for grassroots groups
to share their evidence with," explains WITNESS Program Director

117. See, e.g., eyeWitness to Atrocities (@eyewitnessorg), TWITTER (Mar. 13, 2018,
5:45 AM), https://twitter.com/eyewitnessorg/status/973495319676837889 [https://perma.cc/
J327-8CXG].
118.

See,

e.g.,

DAVID

L.

BROWN, CREATING

CREDIBILITY:

LEGITIMACY

AND

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 3 11 (2008); Diana Hortsch, The
Paradox of Partnership: Amnesty International, Responsible Advocacy, and INGO
Accountability, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 119, 126 35 (2010) (discussing the

International INGO Accountability Charter); Kenneth Anderson, What INGO Accountability
Means-and Does Not Mean, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 170, 174 (2009) (summing up the debate
with reference to a question posed by David Rieff: "So who elected the NGOs?").
119.

EyeWitness User FAQs, supra note 91.

120.

See Ellis, supra note 73, at 273 (explaining how any footage must be sent to the

IBA before being shared elsewhere).
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Sam Gregory. "In general our bias is toward the autonomy of the user." 121
The specific costs and benefits of the involvement of evidence-focused INGOs will become clearer over time. What is not in
doubt, though, is that the production of user-generated evidence does
not occur through the introduction of an app alone. The engagement
of INGOs in outreach to local populations is an essential component
of the success (or failure) of getting user-generated evidence into an
international courtroom. And this is true regardless of whether or not
user-generated evidence is recorded through a specialized app.
B. Technologists
As discussed in Part I, challenges to traditional criminal investigations became increasingly visible around the same time as the
global ICT expansion began to facilitate an explosion of usergenerated content, leading some to wonder whether user-generated
evidence could alleviate the pressure on international investigations. 122 The challenge, however, was how to ensure that footage
gathered by smartphone users could be authenticated to satisfy legal
standards. To that end, the question arose as to whether there could
be a technical solution to the authentication problem through carefully tailored app design. Of course, organizations focused on human
rights, justice, and accountability do not-at least at the current moment-have the in-house technical expertise to design apps themselves.
In order to develop a user-generated evidence app, WITNESS
partnered with the technology group
the Guardian Project, and the
M13
IBA hired its own technologists.
In neither case did these technologists have any particular background in human rights, justice, or accountability-and there is nothing exceptional about this. 124 Technologists rarely have substantive expertise on the underlying issue

121.

See Interview with Gregory, supra note 86.

122. See Ellis, supra note 73, at 269 70 (describing how the question arose, of whether
an app could be designed to address verification concerns, in the context of a mass of
unverifiable user-generated content).
123. See Our Apps: CameraV, GUARDIAN
apps/camerav/ [https://perma.cc/8JB4-MVEP].

PROJECT, https://guardianproject.info/

124. See, e.g., Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REv. 633,
700 (2017) (explaining that the individual coder of an automated decision-making algorithm
is "unlikely to have substantive expertise" about the decision the algorithm is tasked with
making).
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they design their software to handle. 125
The control of technologists over design innovations, like user-generated evidence apps, has been a topic of fascination for legal
scholars since Lawrence Lessig's groundbreaking work Code was
published in 1999.126 It is now commonly acknowledged that "code
reflects the values of its writers and owners." 127 And, as Molly Land
and others have observed, human rights organizations and technologists each generally bring a distinctly different ethos to their work. 128
While the former are inherently conservative in their calculations of
risk, the latter emphasize the value of experimentation and embrace
iterative failures in the name of innovation. 129 There is a risk, therefore, that the risk-conservative approach valued by human rights organizations will be lost as their projects are translated into code that
they themselves do not understand. Still, human rights organizations
can help manage this risk through strong and ongoing communication with the technologists they partner with.
These challenges notwithstanding, both the IBA and
WITNESS understood that the development of a technically sophisticated and replicable methodology behind the process of bringing user-generated evidence into courtrooms would be central to the credibility of their claim that what users filmed would be useful in a court
of
law. 13 aspect
In sum,
involvement
of technologists
nonnegotiable
of the
bringing
user-generated
evidence is
to another
life.

125.

See id.

126.

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).

127.

Lilian Edwards, Coding Privacy, 84CH.-KENT. L. REv. 861,871 (2010).

128.

See

MOLLY

LAND

ET

AL.,

WORLD

BANK,

#ICT4HR

(INFORMATION

AND

COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGWS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS) 31 (2012).

129. See id. at 1 (describing the "modus operandi" of the technology field as in tension
with that of human rights). See also Arvind Narayanan and Shannon Vallor, Why Software
Engineering Courses Should Include Ethics Coverage, 57 COMM. OF THE ACM 23, 24
(2014) (arguing for ethics to be taught to software engineering students on the grounds that
otherwise, when they graduate, "they are likely to adopt the type of thinking that prevails in
many parts of the industry that anything technically feasible is fair game").
130. For a fascinating account of a similar process, albeit in relation to a different
technology, see Arthur Daemmrich, The Evidence Does Not Speak for Itself.- Expert
Witnesses and the Organizationof DNA Typing Companies, 28 SOC. STUD. OF SCI. 741 72
(1998) (detailing how private DNA companies entered the forensic analysis system
traditionally run by state actors and describing how it was crucial for these private actors to
develop and market the credibility of their methodology for use in a courtroom setting).
Underscoring the point, the IBA plans to offer interested courts the code behind the
eyeWitness app. See Interview with Betts, supra note 74.
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C. Users
Smartphone users are the linchpin of user-generated evidence
collection. They are a diverse population, ranging from those who
have opportunistically filmed an atrocity on a one-time basis, to those
who are involved in the systematic collection of atrocity footage. 131
While there are no statistics available, it seems clear from the scale of
content uploaded to social media since around 2011 that users involved in evidence collection constitute a sizeable population. And
the key question for INGOs involved in marketing user-generated evidence apps or otherwise encouraging local populations to document
crimes, as well as for courts relying on user-generated evidence more
generally, is the extent to which they are confident that users fully
comprehend the risks and benefits involved in evidence collection.
As the U.S. Department of Homeland Security emphasized in
its 2011 report on ethical guidelines in ICT research, the kind of
comprehension required by informed consent implies that researchers
must consider "the complex interconnected relationships between us132
ers and the myriad of organizations which provide ICT services."
When it comes to footage, the question of informed consent is typically raised in reference to the relationship between the user and the
subject who is being photographed or filmed.
While that question
is also relevant when it comes to user-generated evidence, the complex issues related to the consent of victims and perpetrators recorded
through user-generated evidence apps lies beyond the focus of this
134
Article.
Instead, with an eye to the new actors in the investigatory
131.

See, e.g.,

Our Methodology, VIOLATIONS DOCUMENTATION CENTER IN SYRIA

(describing how the organization systematically gathers photo and video of victims in the
aftermath of atrocities), http://vdc-sy.net/our-methodology/ Ihttps://perma.cc/6Z3N-XPNF;
Coletivo PapPapo Reto: Combating Police Violence in Brazil, WITNESS (Sept. 2017),
httpsL://witness .org/coletiVo-papo-reto-combating-po1ice-iolence-in-brazil/
[httPs://perma.
cc/U4EB-EBSH] (describing the work of a group of activists in Brazil "who Use cell phones
and social media to counter mainstream naFatives, document abuses, and report police
violence in the Complexo do Alemio").
132.

U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE MENLO REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES GUIDING

INFORMATION & COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH 10 (2012).

133. See, e.g., Philippe Calain, Ethics and Images of Suffering Bodies in Humanitarian
Medicine, 98 SOC. SCI. MED. 278 (2013).
134. It is, however, a question worthy of separate scrutiny. Efforts made to address the
issue in WITNESS's Video as Evidence Field Guide are commendable but represent only a
fraction of what could be said on the topic. The field guide states that "[t]he internationally
agreed-upon standard is that informed consent must be secured when taking testimony in
writing, via audio recording, or via video recording." MATHESON, supra note 104, at 159. It
then notes that in the field "it can be impractical or even impossible to follow this
recommendation," before going on to discuss considerations of disclosure, comprehension,
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ecosystem, the informed consent question arises with respect to the
relationship between the INGOs who have fostered the development
of user-generated evidence apps, the users who have downloaded
them, and, in
135time, the courts who will rely on evidence captured by
those users.
Best practices vary across diverse fields on what it means to
secure meaningful informed consent, but the interconnected principles of voluntariness and comprehension are consistent. 136 Voluntariness incorporates the idea that one party, in this case an INGO, does
not promise,
nor even raise the prospect of, a benefit that is not as137
sured.
This issue of perceived benefits matters because the appeal
of what an individual perceives to be a benefit can influence that individual's assessment of whether to undertake the activity in question. An individual may decide it is worth taking a life-threatening
voluntariness, and competence. Id.
135. Trailblazers in the use of user-generated content within the field of journalism are
just beginning to deal with this same question. See ONA Social NewsgatheringEthics Code,
ONLINE
NEWS
NAT'L
Ass 'N,
https://journalists.org/tools/social-newsgathering/
[https://perma.cc/TY8C-E8VL] (discussing the need to secure "informed consent for the use
of UGC through direct communication with the individual who created it").
136. See, e.g., OXFAM, RESPONSIBLE PROGRAM DATA POLICY 7 (Feb. 17, 2015),
https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/575950/ml-oxfamresponsible-program-data-policy-en-270815.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QU8T-768Q]; What is
Informed Consent?, BBC EDITORIAL GUIDELINES, http://www.bbc.co.uk/editorialguidelines/
guidance/consent/what [https://perma.cc/D5KX-Z2RH]. The history of informed consent in
the medical context begins with the Nuremberg trials of doctors who conducted unlawful
medical experiments during the Holocaust. As part of their verdict, the Nuremberg judges
issued what became known as the Nuremberg Code. The Code explains that informed
consent must be voluntary and that voluntariness means "without the intervention of any
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or
coercion; and [the individual giving consent] should have sufficient knowledge and
comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an
understanding and enlightened decision." OFFICE OF HISTORY, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, THE

NUREMBERG
CODE, https://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/nuremberg.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/6KTA-656D]. The concept of informed consent has also been incorporated into
the U.S. criminal justice system, even if not always under that term. See Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (holding that a defendant's agreement to a plea bargain
"must be [a] voluntary ... knowing, intelligent act[] done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences").
137. This can be tricky even for the most well-intentioned representative. As research
with vulnerable populations in humanitarian and journalism contexts has noted, even if
INGO workers or journalists state that they cannot provide benefits, it is hard to stop the
local population from assuming that there is at least a chance that someone with international
connections will be able to provide themselves or their communities with assistance. See,
e.g., Eileen Pittaway et al., 'Stop Stealing Our Stories': The Ethics of Research with
Vulnerable Groups, 2 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 229, 232 34 (2010).
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risk to record footage if they believe the footage will be used to help
send a perpetrator to jail. They may not make the same decision if
they are uncertain about whether a court would consider their footage
at all.
EyeWitness Project Director Wendy Betts says that in its outreach and training with users, IBA is careful to explain that until the
first piece of this kind of user-generated evidence is introduced in an
international criminal trial, no one really knows for sure whether
judges will accept it. 13 Even so, given the context of an outside organization introducing a sophisticated piece of technology designed
with evidence collection in mind, it seems possible that such caveats
are not fully absorbed by would-be users. Even if users are told that
what they
film may not withstand legal scrutiny, is that what they be139
lieve?
The promised benefit to users is that footage they record can
be used to further legal accountability. On the flipside of the equation, the risks involved relate to the security of the users, as well as to
their family and/or community. The degree to which users who
choose anonymity can really be guaranteed that their identity will
remain protected throughout an adversarial legal process is arguable. 140 But even the guarantee of anonymity as a purely technical
matter is questionable. "We can never know [that a system is foolproof]," says Dia Kayyali, Senior141Program Coordinator for Technology and Advocacy at WITNESS.
In sum, there are unanswered questions affecting the degree
to which informed consent can yet be said to be meaningful in the
user-generated evidence context. Over time, a fuller understanding
of how courts will respond to this kind of evidence, and the degree to
138.

See infra Part III.C. .

139. In a three-year study of informed consent in the medical transplantation context,
there was a significant difference between patient and physician comprehension of the risk
of mortality. Even though patients were informed about the risk of mortality, they
persistently underestimated the likelihood of this risk applying to them. See Stephanie J.
Lee, et al., DiscrepanciesBetween Patient and Physician Estimatesfor the Success of Stem
Cell Transplantation, 285 JAMA 1034 (2001). This same issue of heightened patient
expectations of a positive outcome, notwithstanding the provision of information about risks
in informed consent discussions, has been found in other medical studies. See, e.g., Neal
Meropol et al., Perceptionsof Patients and Physicians Regarding Phase I Cancer Clinical
Trials: Implicationsfor Physician-PatientCommunication, 21 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2589
(2003).
140.

See infra Part III.C.3.

141. Audio tape: Interview by Deyaa Alrwishdi with Dia Kayyali, Senior Program
Coordinator for Technology and Advocacy at WITNESS (on file with the Columbia Journal
of TransnationalLaw).
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which any promises of anonymity can really be upheld, will be crucial.
D. PrivateLawyers

The "cost-free" nature of smartphone recording and the minimal barriers to entry by hitting "record" have resulted in more footage than an international court has resources to sift through in-house.
And the IBA and WITNESS have taken different approaches to the
question of who should do this curation work. By having no centralized depository for the storage of footage, CameraV distributes the
workload; WITNESS expects that users will make their own determination of what footage to submit where. 142 By contrast, all footage
submitted through the eyeWitness app is sent to the IBA in London,
necessitating that they take on this work. 143 Thus, depending on design choices made in the creation of the app, the final set of actors
who may be brought into the investigative ecosystem by the emergence of user-generated evidence is private lawyers. These are the
people who do the necessary work of watching the hours of footage
recorded by users to then catalogue the material, connect investigatory teams to that material, and potentially curate which footage could
be useful for a criminal case.
The sheer volume of user-generated content worldwide means
that the need for cataloguing and curation arises constantly, even outside the evidence-collection context.145 For example, newsrooms and
social media sites have to review incoming material and then make
what can be controversial judgment calls about what user-generated
footage to make accessible (in the case of newsrooms) 146 or to let

142.

See interview with Gregory, supra note 86.

143. See eyeWitness Organisation FAQs, supra note 9 ("When footage is sent to us, a
copy is transferred to a specialised database for analysis by the eyeWitness legal team. This
team analyse [sic] the footage to determine whether they may show that an atrocity crime
was committed.").
144.

See id.

145.

See

Molly

TRANSFORMATION

Land,

Democratizing Human Rights

Fact-Finding, in

OF HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING 399, 402 (Philip Alston &

THE
Sarah

Knuckey, eds. 2016) ("[N]ew technologies have engendered.., the collection of a far
greater volume of information than ever before possible.") (emphasis in original).
146. See, e.g., Joe Concha, Graphic Videos Spark Questionsfor Facebook, Journalism,
THE HILL (July 10, 2016), http://thehill.com/homenews/287166-graphic-videos-sparkquestions-for-facebook-journalism
[https://perma.cc/ZL9C-RTQZ]
(discussing CNN's
decision to screen user-generated content of a police officer being executed by a sniper).
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remain accessible (in the case of social media sites)147 to a wide audience. Relative to professionals in these other fields, those involved
in international criminal investigations are at an embryonic stage in
trying to figure out how to navigate the challenge of having an abundance of user-generated material to sort through.
What seems probable at this point is that, unlike a newsroom
where journalists within the same organization catalogue the incoming material and decide which of it to use, in the new investigatory
ecosystem, the functions of cataloguing and curation will be split
across individuals and organizations. 14 This, then, requires someone-whether a user in a decentralized system or a private lawyer in
a centralized system-to take on the role of connecting an investigator to the available material. But access to investigators and their interests is often difficult, and so exactly how best to do this coordination is something that no one working on user-generated evidence
collection has yet figured out. 149
As noted above, WITNESS's approach is to leave the task up
to individual users. The IBA, meanwhile, has a full-time senior legal
advisor and eleven pro bono attorneys from three law firms who
watch and catalogue footage that comes through the eyeWitness app.
The lawyers' task is to tag the footage for the presence of relevant
features, such as license plates and uniform insignia, and to provide
an "objective description" of what they watched. 15 As other apps
are developed, and as users continue to post their cellphone footage
directly on social media sites, this curation task will only become
more unwieldy.

147. See, e.g., Heidi Glenn, How Facebook Uses Technology to Block Terrorist-Related
Content, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (June 22, 2017, 4:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/
alltechconsidered/2017/06/22/533855547/how-facebook-uses-technology-to-block-terroristrelated-content [https://perma.cc/FDM8-4QKL] (discussing Facebook's effort to remove
terrorist propaganda, while also respecting free speech).
148. See eyeWitness Organisation FAQs, supra note 9 (explaining that eyeWitness may
work with local organizations to verify footage, raise awareness, and to ensure that
perpetrators are brought to justice).
149. See Interview with Betts, supra note 74 (describing coordination as the next major
challenge facing the field).
150. See id. Objectivity is challenging but important, lest a future investigative team
want to use the footage for a purpose that does not match the cataloguer's subjective
description.
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COMPLICATING THE PICTURE

Part II explained how the advent of user-generated evidence
means not only the introduction of a new form of technology into the
investigative space, but also a host of new actors and relationships. It
mapped out those actors and discussed some of the challenges that
their interaction brings. Notwithstanding the significance of some of
these challenges, the engagement of new actors is not inconsistent
with the possibility that user-generated evidence will serve a transformative function.
The following section, however, delves into more fundamental concerns about the impact of user-generated evidence. Moving
sequentially through each stage in the lifecycle of user-generated evidence, from collection and evaluation to a criminal trial and its aftermath, this section identifies several recurring concerns that can be
grouped into three broad categories: (i) user security, (ii) evidentiary
bias, and (iii) fair trial rights.
The burden of the first of these concerns falls on the shoulders of the user who may have taken life-threatening risks to document atrocities in the belief they could help achieve legal accountability, only to find that the footage never reaches a court investigator
or that, even after reaching a court, it ultimately serves a different
purpose than the user intended. Even if the user's expectations are
met in terms of how their footage is used, risks to the user's security
follow users from the moment of filming through to the aftermath of
an eventual trial. In traditional international investigations, the court
takes on protection obligations to those who have supported the
court's work. Yet in the new investigations ecosystem described in
Part II, there is no one accountable if-or when-a user's safety is in
jeopardy.
The second set of concerns, related to evidentiary bias, poses
a challenge for more traditional legal actors. Judges, as well as prosecution and defense lawyers, need to be attuned to the risks that arise
not only through the biases that affect our perception of visual evidence in general, but also through the selective nature of real-time
evidence collection, especially when those doing the documentation
may have a personal stake in what they are recording.
These actors must also be vigilant when it comes to the final
category of concern: fair trial rights. To date, the collection of usergenerated evidence in the international criminal realm has been a project directed toward strengthening the hand of prosecutors. 151 In this
151.

See U.C.

BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS CTR.,

supra note 33, at 3
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regard, not only is a lack of parity unfair to defendants, it also undermines the legitimacy of international criminal justice more generally.
If not addressed, these concerns could undermine any transformative role that user-generated evidence might play. Indeed, the
emergence of user-generated evidence may end up addressing some
of the problems with the current investigatory system at the cost of
creating new problems, entrenching old ones, and/or simply shifting
existing problems from traditional actors, who have institutional support, to individual users who have no such institutional protections.
A. Evidence Collection Stage

The collection of user-generated evidence begins with users
in a conflict-affected area documenting evidence of atrocities. This
stage in the lifecycle of user-generated evidence brings several risks:
security threats to users, the potential that evidence gathered by these
users will reflect intra-conflict partisan bias, and the possibility that
the material they gather will feed into an evidentiary record that
skews systematically in favor of the prosecution, thereby exacerbating existing concerns about the inequality of arms in international
criminal law.
1. Risks to the User
Collecting incriminating evidence is an inherently risky task
under many circumstances. Those risks are heightened significantly
when it comes to user-generated evidence because the evidence collection often happens in real time.'52 As a result, the perpetrator(s)
and their allies are likely to be on the scene or in the vicinity, and
thus can retaliate against the user.
The advent of user-generated evidence is too new for there to

("Improving the collection and analysis of digital information can enhance the Office of the
Prosecutor's ability to secure quality evidence that results in convictions, as well as diversify
evidence coming into the courtroom.").
152. See, e.g., FAQs: User Safety, EYEWITNESS [hereinafer eyeWitness User Safety
FAQs], http://www.eyewitnessproject.org/# [https://perma.cc/XXZ8-WHZB] (Click "FAQs"
link in upper right hand of page, then "User safety," and then "Click for more details on user
safety") ("There are always risks involved with documenting human rights abuses. There is
not only danger from the user's proximity to a volatile situation, but also the risk of arrest or
other repercussions from authorities who do not want information about their actions to be
publicised. No technology can completely eliminate those risks.").
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be a robust literature on the risks of retaliation that users may face.
But the likelihood of retaliation can be gleaned from other sources.
Domestically, for example, there was an initial optimism running
through the scholarship and commentary on domestic policing, about
the possibility of cellphone recordings shifting the existing
(im)balance of power between police and citizens. "When there are
no cameras, the advantage goes to the shooter.... Where there are
cameras, however, the playing field is leveled."153 Yet the citizens
who filmed the high-profile police shootings of Alton Sterling, Philando Castile,
Freddie Gray, and Eric Garner were all subsequently
154
arrested.
Even in lower-profile cases, citizens who have recorded police conduct that they believed was questionable or unlawful have
been subject to a range of retaliatory actions. In states with strict
wiretapping statutes, police have arrested users and charged them
with violations of wiretapping provisions.155 Courts have generally
found that such statutes do not extend to police officers performing
official duties in public; however, this has not stopped police from
using wiretapping statutes as the basis for making an arrest, even if
156
the
are ultimately
dismissed.
in states
without
suchcharges
wiretapping
provisions,
police have Moreover,
used broader
charges,
such

153. Charles Cooke, quoted in David Uberti, How Smartphone Video Changes
Coverage of Police Abuse, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.cjr.org/
analysis/smartphone video changes coverage.php [https://perma.cc/US8P-E8G9]. See also
Simonson, supra note 23, at 1564 ("When civilians film the police, local residents become
the ones ensuring police accountability, resulting in a palpable power shift. Local residents
remain in control of the footage and the information.").
154. See PEN AM., More Than 40,000 Americans Call on Justice Department to
Investigate Retaliation Against Those Who Document Alleged Police Misconduct (Oct. 26,
2016), https://pen.org/press-release/more-than-40000-americans-call-on-justice-departmentto-investigate-retaliation-against-those-who-document-alleged-police-misconduct
[https://
perma.cc/B6DP-DSTV]. The majority of these arrests did not result in any formal charges
against the detained cameraperson. See Jamiles Lartey, Film Makers Demand Inquiry into
'Targeting' of People Who Record Police, GUARDIAN
(Aug.
12,
2016,
3:55 BST), https://www.theguardian.com/film/2016/aug/10/filmmakers-citizen-journalistsjustice-department-investigation [https://perma.cc/5YBP-AV5T].
155. See, e.g., Dustin F. Robinson, Bad Footage: Surveillance Laws, Police
Misconduct, and the Internet, 100 GEO. L.J. 1399, 1400 13 (2012) (describing cases
involving prosecutions under wiretapping statutes for the filming of police misconduct). See
also Michael Potere, Comment, Who Will Watch the Watchmen? Citizens Recording Police
Misconduct, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 273 (2012).
156. See Radley Balko, Despite Court Rulings, People Are Still Getting Arrested for
Recording On-Duty Cops, WASH. POST (May 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-watch/wp/2014/05/13/despite-court-rulings-people-are-still-getting-arrested-forrecording-on-duty-cops/?utm term=.c9afed401422 [https://perma.cc/AA86-TGD4].
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as disorderly conduct, to arrest users for filming. 157 And beyond the
risk of arrest and prosecution, users have reported feeling so unsafe
as to have given up on filming police misconduct altogether. 158
Internationally, the risks are clear from the forms of retaliation faced by those seeking to document atrocities in Syria. As of
October 2018, the Committee to Protect Journalists had confirmed
the killings of 123 Syrian journalists. 159 Further indications of the
risks involved come from retaliation faced by local Syrians who have
been working for the Syrian Commission on Justice and Accountability, a Brussels-based non-profit group that is trying to smuggle documentation out of Syria with an eye to eventual criminal prosecutions. Several of their local investigators have been injured and at
least one is presumed dead. 160
Finally, the security threats faced by past and current ICC
witnesses may also provide some indication of the risks involved for
users. Many users are, in a literal sense, witnesses; they often witnessed the commission of the atrocities they seek to document.
While the Court does not publish statistics on the number of its witnesses that face security threats, it is possible to get a sense of the
scale of the problem when considering that in the Court's first case,
the OTP, over a ten-week period, referred thirty-two witnesses into
the Court's protection program. 16 That program was established to
157. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 61, at 361; N. Stewart Hanley, A Dangerous Trend:
Arresting Citizens for Recording Law Enforcement, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 645, at 647 50
(2010). See also Emma Whitford, Man Who Filmed Eric Garner'sMurder Begins 4 Year
Prison Sentence Today, GOTHAMIST (Oct. 30, 2016), http://gothamist.com/2016/10/03/
eric-garner ramsey-orta.php [https://perma.cc/B2K5-7SL6].
158. See Interview with a Representative of a Cop-Watching Organization, in Jocelyn
Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CAL. L. REv. 393, 429 n.203 (2016).
159. 123 Journalists Killed in Syria/Motive Confirmed, COMM. TO PROTECT
JOURNALISTS, https://cpj.org/killed/mideast/syria/ [https://perma.cc/46BC-68Q8]. See also,
Rayan Mohammad, Syrian journalists Who Sacrificed Everything to Cover the Revolution,
NEW ARAB (Mar. 15, 2017) (Karim Traboulsi trans.), https://www.alaraby.co.uk/
english/indepth/2017/3/15/syrian-journalists-who-sacrificed-everything-to-cover-therevolution [https://perma.cc/CDC7-8SKC] (providing a narrative account of five Syrian
journalists targeted for their documentation activities).
160. See At Great Risk, Group Gathers Evidence of War Crimes in Syria, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (Jan. 26, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/01/26/266504389/at-great-risk-groupgathers-evidence-of-war-crimes-in-syria [https://perma.cc/HMQ8-89H5].

161.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COURTING HISTORY:

THE LANDMARK INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT'S FIRST YEARS TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 161 62 (July 2008)

https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/icc07O8- 1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UWH7TKQN] (relying on court documents to determine that twenty-four witnesses were referred
to the Court's protection program in September 2007, followed by about eight in midDecember of that year).
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162
protect those who are at risk of "harm and/or death."
The INGOs and technologists involved in the design of usergenerated evidence apps are aware of the risk of retaliation.163 As a
result, both eyeWitness and CameraVhave been designed with inbuilt
safety features to enable users to quickly delete material and, in the
case of eyeWitness, to make it appear to the lay viewer as though the
app is not even on the phone at all. 164

As IBA Executive Director Mark Ellis readily acknowledges,
however, these design features are not infallible: "If you are using
this in a country that is pretty good at figuring out how to deal with
these, will they be able to take the device and say 'all right... I'm
going to find out what's in there?' I think it would be disingenuous
to say no ....
[But we wanted to165create] a first line of defense .... I
think that's the best we can do.",
Still, it is at least questionable that users on the ground factor
in these risks when they have an app in hand that contains these security features. To the extent that true informed consent is actually
achieved, any security threat to the user is plausibly the responsibility
of that fully informed user. But what
166 about those for whom the informed consent process is deficient?
Under the traditional approach to evidence collection at the
ICC, the Court itself takes on protection responsibilities for "witnesses, victims who appear before the Court, and others who are at risk
on account of testimony given by such witnesses." 167 Users who
record crime as it unfolds are witnesses to that crime, and to the extent they go on to testify about what they filmed, they fall squarely
under a traditional understanding of who a witness is. For those users who film linkage evidence after the fact, and who never appear in
the Hague, their role is arguably more akin to that of an intermediary-someone who connects the Court with a witness. And, for now
at least, the Court only offers protection services to intermediaries on

162.

INT'L CRIM. CT., REGULATIONS OF THE REGISTRY, Reg. 96(1) (2006).

163. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 73, at 274 (2015) ("We learned early on in this process
that one hundred percent security will never be met; can't do it."); MATHESON, supra note
104, at 7, 18, 29, 39, 57, 76, 89, 102, 111, 137, 166 (noting at the top of every section that
"[f]ilming for human rights can be dangerous. It can put you, the people you are filming and
the communities you are filming in at risk. Carefully assess the risks before you press
record. "').
164.

EyeWitness User Safety FAQs, supra note 152.

165.

Ellis, supra note 73, at 279.

166.

See supra Part II.C.

167.

Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 43(6).
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a case-by-case basis.168 Still, it is fair to conclude that if users were
part of the traditional investigatory space, rather than the new one described in Part II, the Court would be responsible for the protection
of many of them.
In practice, this would mean that users would have access to a
twenty-four/seven emergency line-the Initial Response Systemthrough which the Court would evacuate them if necessary. 169 And it
would mean they could be assessed for a range of other protective
measures, including permanent relocation. 170 To be sure, the Court's
protection system is far from perfect. As Human Rights Watch concluded when the OTP's Kenya cases fell apart, "The court appears to
have been unprepared to deal adequately with witness protection
needs." 171 Nonetheless, access to a protection system that needs improvement is a far cry from the complete absence of options currently
available to users working in the new investigatory ecosystem.
2. Inequality of Arms
Drawing on human rights law, international criminal tribunals
have recognized the equality of172arms as a fundamental principle of a
defendant's right to a fair trial.
Equality of arms requires that the
defendant can present his case to the court "under conditions that do
not place him at a disadvantage vis-d-vis his opponent." 171 Yet, the
emergence of user-generated evidence risks creating exactly this sort
of disadvantage to defendants relative to the prosecution.
User-generated evidence is more likely to be gathered, in the
international context at least, by users seeking to document incriminatory, rather than exculpatory, evidence-in other words, material
168.

See infra Part IV.B.1.

169.

INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, SUMMARY REPORT ON THE ROUND TABLE ON THE
PROTECTION OF VICTIMS AND WITNESSES BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1 2
(2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/19869519-923D-4F67-A61F-35F78E424C68/
280579/ReportENG08767415-4FID-46BA-B4085B447B3AFC8D/0/Protectionseminar
SUMMARY.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EVW-7397].
170.

Id.

171. ICC: Kenya Deputy President'sCase Ends, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 5, 2016,
3:02 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/05/icc-kenya-deputy-presidents-case-ends
[https://perma.cc/6HTK-974V].
172. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 44 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15,
1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf [https://perma.cc/T33P-JHCV]; see also Rome Statute.
supra note 19, art. 67.
173.

Bulut v. Austria, 24 Eur H.R. Rep. 84,

47 (1996).
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that will serve the prosecution. The primary reason for this is that
there are no organized groups of citizens in atrocity situations who
are mobilized by the goal of ensuring the rights of those accused of
war crimes. 174 And this disparity is compounded by the fact that, for
reasons discussed earlier, the promotion of user-generated evidence
apps has been motivated by a desire to strengthen the investigative
work of international prosecutors175against the backdrop of high-profile
prosecution failures at the ICC.
As such, while both the IBA and
WITNESS have made efforts to reach out to defense counsel, the design and marketing of user-generated apps invariably flow from consultation with more prosecutors than defense lawyers. 176 While
courts have shunned the idea that equality of arms requires equality
of resources, 177 the collection of user-generated evidence may nonetheless exacerbate already significant problems regarding equality of
arms17 8between prosecution and defense in international criminal trials.

174. By contrast, there is a growing awareness in the domestic context of the risk of
wrongful conviction, especially in altercations between black citizens and police, and the
need to ensure that exonerating evidence is preserved.
175.

See supra Part I.A.

176. See Interview with Betts, supra note 74 (explaining that while the IBA sees the
material gathered through its app as potentially just as useful for exonerating purposes, the
defense counsel they have met with have indicated ambivalence). Notwithstanding Betts's
view of the potential to document exonerating evidence, the eyeWitness materials make no
reference to exonerating evidence, and their advisory board includes several well-respected
international prosecutors but no one who has worked for a defense team. See About
eyeWitness-Our People, EYEWITNESS, http://www.eyewitnessproject.org/ [https://perma.
cc/V9Q7-3LUD] (click "About" link in upper right hand corner and then "Our people").
WITNESS's Video as Evidence field guide does make an effort at balance when it lists as a
core principle the goal of seeking the truth. To that end, it notes, "If you capture evidence
that suggests someone's innocence, don't fear it. The end goal is to hold accountable those
actually responsible for crimes and to ensure the innocent are not wrongly accused."
MATHESON, supra note 104, at 48. But here again, the initial collaboration between the IBA
and WITNESS meant that part of the consultations that fed into the CameraV concept were
also skewed in favor of a prosecution perspective.
177. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment,
(June 1, 2001).

63 70,

178. See, e.g., Charles Jalloh & and Amy DiBella, Equality of Arms in International
Criminal Law:
Continuing Challenges, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW-CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, at 251 (William Schabas et al. eds.,
2013). This concern is applicable to third-parties involved in the investigatory sphere more
generally, not just users doing documentation on a user-generated evidence app.
Baylis, supra note 3, at 144 ("[M]any of the involved third parties are committed to
promoting particular ideals and are not constrained by ethical obligations of fairness to
particular defendants.").
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3. Bias and Distortion
It is difficult for the designers of an app to control who will
download it. And once an app is onsite, users have discretion as to
what to capture. Moreover, user-generated evidence of any form can
be gathered by a rebel fighter intent on documenting atrocities committed by his or her enemy as readily as it can be gathered by a civilian intent on faithfully documenting atrocities committed by any party to a conflict.
This reality has the potential to skew the
investigative process.
To take a simplified example, imagine a conflict where rebel
group A commits, on average, twenty percent of the atrocities and
rebel group B commits the remaining eighty percent. In this scenario, if rebel group B documents violations committed by rebel group
A, then the incoming footage from the conflict will capture many
crimes committed by rebel group A, but none by rebel group B, thus
generating a distorted picture of what is actually happening on the
ground.
Moreover, to the extent that user-generated evidence displaces other material gathered by third-parties, such as that typically
gathered by first responder INGOs, there may be some distortion in
the ultimate trial record. Material recorded with an eye to individual
criminal prosecutions is likely to be systematically different from
material recorded for broader analysis or advocacy purposes. 179 As
discussed earlier, the assessment of what is valuable in a given scene
is tightly circumscribed when the goal is evidence collection for a
criminal prosecution, in a way that it is not otherwise. 18 Firstresponder organizations generally gather material to establish the
broader context in which atrocities are occurring.i11 And as trained

179. For a fuller discussion on the way individual criminal prosecutions risk obscuring
the full picture of criminality, see Rebecca Hamilton, State-Enabled Crimes, 41 YALE J.
INT'L L. 302 (2016).

180. See supra, notes 84 85 and accompanying text. Professor Lawrence Douglas has
raised this concern in relation to the use of documentary footage in the Nuremberg trials,
noting how the framing and narration of the footage focused on what was needed to support
the legal case in relation to the commission of crimes against the peace, at the expense of
focusing on genocide, which was not central to the legal case. See Douglas, supra note 31,
at 480. See also Noel Whitty, Soldier Photography of Detainee Abuse in Iraq: Digital
Technology, Human Rights and the Death of Baha Mousa, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 689, 689
90 (2010) (observing how certain images of atrocity have served to limit our understanding
of atrocities).
181. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of Human Rights
Fact-Finding,3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 83, 99 101 (1990) (explaining how the very conscious
effort by human rights organizations to "contextualize" the atrocities they report on serves to
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professionals, they are attuned to questions of representativeness in a
way that most users are not. 182 For those who believe that a core
purpose of international criminal trials is to provide an accurate historical record of a conflict, a shift from relying on materials from
first-responder 183
organizations to user-generated evidence may undermine that goal.
One obvious way to guard against these sorts of distortions is
to ensure that user-generated evidence is not the only form of evidence flowing into an investigative process. Its optimal role is to
bolster other forms of evidence gathered by professionals who are attuned to questions of impartiality and representativeness. Yet even
assuming user-generated evidence only serves this supplementary
function, there is a risk that those assessing the various types of incoming evidence will give user-generated evidence an outsized
weight. As Susan Sontag recognized some four decades ago, people
routinely find visual evidence more compelling than evidence presented in textual form. 184
B. Evidence Evaluation Stage

Once user-generated evidence has been gathered, the next
step is to evaluate its legal relevance. As discussed in Part II, the
sheer volume of material created by users means that courts do not
themselves have the resources to take on the entirety of this evalua"anticipate and address" potential charges of bias that would discredit their reporting).
182. Jay D. Aronson, Mobile Phones, Social Media and Big Data in Human Rights
Fact-Finding: Possibilities, Challenges, and Limitations, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING 443, 445 (Philip Alston & Sarah Knuckey eds.) (2016)
(discussing how representativeness is an ongoing concern within the human rights
community).
183. For the debate about whether the creation of an accurate historical record should be
a core goal of international criminal justice, see e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN
JERUSALEM:

A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 253 (Penguin Books 2006) (1963)

(arguing that any effort to use a trial to create a historical record "can only detract from the
law's main business: to weigh the charges against the accused, to render judgment, and to
mete out due punishment"); cf RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 73 (2000) ("[T]he
criminal trial enables the establishment of a historical record at the highest legal standard of
certainty.").
184. SONTAG, supra note 1, at 5. Sontag's work is part of a significant body of literature
concerned with the power of the visual image, in areas spanning foreign affairs, see, e.g.,
David Domke et al., The Primes of our Times? An Examination of the 'Power' of Visual
Images, 3 JOURNALISM 131 (2002), and trial advocacy, see, e.g., Open Forum, A Videotape
is Worth a Thousand Words: The Use of Demonstrative Evidence in the Defense of an
Automobile Products Liability Case, 50 INS. COUNSEL J. 94 (1983).
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tive work. External actors must do some filtering; this raises the
question of how to coordinate the transfer of material from those external actors into the hands of investigators. Moreover, this curation
work raises its own challenges, and the outsourcing of a typically
public function into private hands again raises concerns regarding the
fair trial rights of defendants and the security of users.
1. The Coordination Challenge
At present, those eager to see user-generated evidence make
its way into international courtrooms are still grappling with how to
get such footage into the hands of an investigative team. "We don't
know what information we have that may or may not be relevant to
an investigation," explains IBA Director Wendy Betts.185 It is not
only a problem of not knowing what situations are under investigation but, within a given investigation, what lines of inquiry are being
pursued. And this coordination problem is not limited to the IBA.
"There's a number of groups also doing verification of information,"
says Betts, "and investigators don't have the resources to go,,186
door-todoor of every organization to ask what material they have.'
Nor
are they able to reach out to every user directly. Thus, there is a risk
that valuable evidence may be recorded yet never make it into a criminal investigation.
Unless or until this is resolved, it must be asked: what kind of
harm occurs when a user takes risks to film evidence on the assumption that it will inform a criminal investigation, when in fact the footage never reaches anyone with authority to launch an investigation?
The harm is not a strictly legal one; there is no contract guaranteeing
that footage filmed by a user will make it into an investigation. The
organizations doing outreach urge users not to put themselves in
harm's way. And concerns about informed consent notwithstanding,
the decision to take risks to secure footage is ultimately in the hands
of the user. But there is still something disquieting about a scenario
in which users take risks, perhaps even losing their lives, in the belief
that they are securing footage that will contribute to legal accountability for what they have witnessed, only for that footage never to
reach an investigator's desk.

185.

Interview with Betts, supra note 74.

186.

Id.
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2. Obligations to Defendants
Whether user-generated evidence is recorded directly, or
through CameraV, eyeWitness, or other apps designed in the future,
the task of curating which footage will be used in a criminal case
would ideally remain in the hands of court investigators. For it to be
otherwise would mean, in the case of an app designed with a central
depository like eyeWitness, that private lawyers would be using their
discretion to help determine which crimes might or might not be investigated and which individuals might or might not be prosecutedin other words, the kind of function usually reserved to a prosecutor. 187
In addition, when material comes into a prosecutor's office,
there is an obligation to review it, not only for incriminating evidence, but also for exculpatory material that the prosecution must
disclose to the defense.1 88 To the extent that private lawyers are not
bound by these obligations, outsourcing the curation of this material
to them could harm the rights of the accused.
3. Information Security
Security is a serious concern at the evidence collection stage,
but it does not end there. Even if footage is encrypted and sent to a
secure location (the IBA' s "secure evidence locker" in the case of the
eyeWitness app, or a site of the user's choosing in the case of CameraV), the information is not necessarily safe, for two reasons.18 9 First,
there is always a risk that these secure sites will be hacked. In relation to evidence recorded on the eyeWitness app, the IBA promises
that "[o]ur partnerships with Lexis Nexis, DLA Piper, and international law firms make sure that all footage is secure from hack187. It should be noted that there is nothing stopping a user of either of the usergenerated evidence apps currently in existence from sending their footage directly to the
ICC. One of the ICC's statutory provisions ensures that the court receives communications
from members of the public who have information about alleged crimes. Rome Statute,
supra note 19, art. 15. And in such a scenario, court staff review the incoming material
themselves. But the court has not done any broad public outreach about this option, and it is
unlikely that non-professionals would, on their own, manage to navigate their way to the
court's website, find information about this option, and send sensitive information to the
generic "information desk" email provided. See Get Involved, ICC-CPI, https://www.icccpi.intlget-involved/Pages/ngos.aspx [https://perma.cc/4SAR-RJ7X].
188. In relation to the ICC, this obligation flows from Art. 67(2) of the Rome Statute.
Domestically, the obligation flows from the U.S. Constitution, as first articulated in Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 87, 87 88 (1963).
189.

See, e.g., eyeWitness User Safety FAQs, supra note 152.
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ing. ' ' 190 Yet with all the best protocols in place, recent experience
suggests that highly motivated hackers are able to breach sophisticated information security systems. 19 1 Second, it is difficult to say how
any of the secure sites to which users transmit their footage would
handle a19fovernment subpoena for footage or the metadata associated
with it. f
Uncertainties over information security relate, once again, to
questions about obligations toward users who transmit footage from a
user-generated evidence app on the assumption that the footage will
be secure. If a secure server is hacked, or a government does request
footage, who-if anyone-is responsible to the users who relied on
assurances that the footage they submitted would be secure?
C. Trial Stage and Its Aftermath
As should be clear, a significant portion of the user-generated
evidence story unfolds in the period before this evidence is ever considered for admission in a courtroom. Nonetheless, the trial and its
aftermath do raise another set of salient concerns in the context of user-generated evidence. First, there is the threshold question of
whether courts will even agree to admit this kind of evidence at trial,
and whether they can or should do so without compromising the anonymity of users who wish to remain anonymous. Second, there is the
issue of how judges will interpret and weigh user-generated evidence
that they do admit, and what role cognitive and visual bias may play
in that process. Finally, it is important to recognize that the security
risks to users extend beyond the end of the trial itself.

190.

INT'L BAR ASS'N, supranote 110.

191. See, e.g., Tracey Lien, Yahoo Hacked: Personal Data Stolen from at Least 500
Million Accounts, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016, 3:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/
technology/la-fi-tn-yahoo-hacked-20160922-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/SRB95QWL].
192. Wendy Betts, Director of the eyeWitness to Atrocities Program, says her team
assumes it is only a matter of time before they receive a subpoena requesting footage that
they are storing. With their server located in London, their response will vary based on the
bilateral agreement that the U.K. has with the requesting government. Betts says that based
on their research of these agreements, they are at least confident that they will be protected
from any "fishing expeditions." She adds, "if we have a specific piece of information that is
useful for a legitimate investigation, we are not opposed to that information going forward."
Interview with Betts, supra note 74.
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1. Admissibility
The promise of user-generated evidence rests on the assumption that courts will actually be willing to admit it. At least until the
al-Werfalli trial commences, however, there is no certainty around
that assumption. Still, there is some cause for optimism given the
high degree of judicial discretion built into the ICC's evidentiary
standards.
Article 69(4) of the Rome Statute requires that judges consider "the probative value of the evidence and any prejudice that such
evidence may cause.' ' 193 And Rule 63(2) of the ICC's Rules of Procedure and Evidence gives judges the authority to "assess freely all
evidence submitted in order to determine its relevance or admissibility."' 194 The broad parameters around the admission of evidence at

the ICC will be striking to most readers accustomed to the U.S. domestic practice system. But this has long been the norm within international criminal justice, on the basis that international courts do not
have a jury. Dating back to the views of Justice Jackson during the
Nuremberg Trials, more relaxed standards of evidence have been justified on the assumption that judges, as opposed to laypeople, are195
less
arguments.
prejudicial
or
non-credible
to
exposure
by
influenced
Those who have led the development of user-generated evidence apps hope that judges will use their discretion to treat video as
evidence. "There's a valid legal argument to make that the app itself
is the witness," says eyeWitness to Atrocities Program Director

193.

Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 69(4).

194. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Assembly of
States Parties, 1st Sess., Rule 63(2), ICC-ASP/1/3 (2002) [hereinafter ICC Rules of
Procedure], https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/pids/legal-texts/rulesprocedureevidenceeng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FF6N-RR75].
195. See Douglas, supra note 31, at 467 (referencing comments made by Justice Jackson
and explaining judges, as opposed to juries, could "weigh the relevance of hearsay testimony
and would be less susceptible to being swayed by tendentious or prejudicial arguments").

See also Ellen Wessel et al., Credibility of the Emotional Witness: A Study of Ratings by
Court Judges, 30 L. HUM. BEHAV. 221 (2006) (for evidence to support confidence in the
relative expertise of judges); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 n.5 (2006). In Scott, eight
justices signed onto an opinion that highlighted the overwhelming power of visual evidence;
the justices chastised the lower court for deciding that (non-visual) testimony provided by
Harris created enough of a dispute about the facts to deny Officer Scott's motion for
summary judgment when, in the view of the justices, the dashboard camera recording
supported Scott's version of events. In the majority opinion, which has since been critiqued
for its visual literalism, Justice Scalia wrote that the lower court "should have viewed the
facts in the light depicted by the videotape." Id. at 381. For a compelling critique of the
Court's decision in Scott, see Kahan et al., supra note 24.
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196
Wendy Betts.
With respect to situations in which a user is willing to be
identified, the IBA's confidence in the admissibility of usergenerated evidence seems well-founded. ICC judges have routinely
admitted evidence gathered by third-parties, such as INGOs, when
that third-party is known to the court and the evidence they present
can be shown to have a reliable methodology behind it.197 The judges have, however, noted that such reports may only be admitted "for
the limited purpose that the information contained therein may serve
to corroborate other pieces of evidence." 198 Still, if the goal of usergenerated evidence is to supplement, rather than supplant, other
forms of evidence, then this corroborating role is all that is needed.
With respect to users who have chosen to be anonymous,
however, the clues to be gleaned from the court's decisions to date
suggest that the admission of user-generated evidence is much less
certain. For example, the Gbagbo case suggests a bleak outlook for
user-generated evidence captured by an anonymous user. The judges
in that case found it "highly problematic" when they did not know
the source of the information presented by the prosecution and concluded that without such information it was "impossible to determine
what probative value to attribute to the information." 199 This skepticism is consistent with the view of judges at the ICTY who also "expressed particular 'concern
about admission of reports based on anon200
ymous testimony."
Another possibility is that the judges simply demand that the
identity of an anonymous user be disclosed to the defense before admitting user-generated evidence captured by that individual. If the
technology works as promised, then the prosecution would not themselves know the identity of a user who chose to be anonymous.201
This would obviously mean they would be unable to comply with the

196.

Interview with Betts, supra note 74.

197. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on the
Admission into Evidence of Items Deferred in the Chamber's "Decision on the Prosecution's
Application for Admission of Materials into Evidence Pursuant to Article 64(9) of the Rome
Statute,"
21 (June 27, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013 04725.pdf
[https://perma.cc/494G-HVRP] (admitting reports by Amnesty International and F~d~ration
Internationale des Droits de 1'Homme into evidence).
198.

Id.

22.

199. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision Adjourning the
Hearing on the Confirmation of Charges, 129 (June 3, 2013), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04878.pdf [https://perma.cc/57ZY-BAY6].
200.

Baylis, supra note 3, at 129.

201.

See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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court's order, presumably leading the Court to deem the piece of user-generated evidence inadmissible. If, on the other hand, the prosecution has been able to find out the identity of the user, then they will
be faced with the dilemma of choosing between honoring the user's
desire of anonymity and using the evidence.
Lest the above scenario sound extreme, it is worth recalling
that the ICC trial chamber in Lubanga ordered the prosecution to disclose the identity of one of its intermediaries to the defense.2 °2 Given
the security concerns that the prosecution raised in relation to its intermediaries, the trial chamber was initially comfortable with the anonymity of intermediaries being maintained. But once credible allegations arose that a particular intermediary may have coerced
witnesses into giving false testimony, the court concluded that the defense had the right to know the identity of that intermediary. 2 °3 And
when the prosecution refused, the court went so far as to stay the proceedings.
There is a clear analogy to be drawn between an intermediary and a user to the extent that both take on the role of gathering evidence on behalf of the prosecution. Given this, it seems at
least plausible that the court would refuse to admit evidence procured
by someone whose identity is hidden from the defense if the defense
raised credible allegations about the veracity of the evidence provided.
2. Interpretation
Certain visual biases systematically influence what we see.
202.

Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Redacted Decision on

Intermediaries,

37

(May

31,

2010),

https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/

CR2010_03672.pdf [https://perma.cc/QV9K-5EVT] (ordering the prosecution to disclose
the identity of one of its intermediaries to the defense).
203.

Id.

135 50 (explaining

the reasons for ordering the

disclosure of an

intermediary's identity).
204. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Redacted Decision on the
Prosecution's Urgent Request for Variation of the Time Limit to Disclose the Identity of
Intermediary

143,

20

(July

8,

2013),

https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/

CR2010_04749.pdf [https://perma.cc/GLJ7-ZUM6] (ordering a stay of proceedings after the
prosecution refused to disclose the identity of an intermediary). This decision was
ultimately overturned by the Appeals Chamber on the grounds that sanctions should have
first been implemented before resorting to a stay. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06, Judgment Decision on the Prosecutor's Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the
Decision of Trial Chamber I of 8 July 2010, 33 (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.worldcourts.
comicc/eng/decisions/2010.10.08_Prosecutor v Lubangal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SM26-

WZ7R] (reversing the Trial Chamber's decision to stay proceedings upon finding that
sanctions should have been implemented first, before resorting to a stay of proceedings).
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When it comes to watching video footage, the phenomenon of illusory causation leads us to attribute an unwarranted degree of causal influence to the object or person we happen to be looking at.20 5 Over
two decades of research by cognitive scientists demonstrates the realworld applicability of this phenomenon. For example, when asked to
watch a video of a suspect's confession where the camera is facing
the suspect, viewers were consistently more likely to perceive the
suspect's confession as voluntary and judge the suspect to be guilty
than when presented with the exact same testimony in textual form or
when the camera was facing the interviewing officer.206
Judges are not immune to these biases. A 2007 study presented experienced judges with a videotaped confession filmed from
different perspectives.
The study found that judges were just 2as8
susceptible to the phenomenon of illusory causation as laypeople. 0
The judges were significantly more likely to conclude that the suspect's confession was voluntary when the camera was facing the suspect than when they watched the identical confession with the camera
in a neutral position or facing the interviewing officer. 209
In addition to interpreting what they see, international judges
are also responsible for determining how much weight to give to
what they have watched. 2 10 Here, the question of the user's identity
may again be central. Presented with the same segment of footage,
judges may assign differing levels of evidentiary weight based on
characteristics related to the user who filmed the footage. An indepth study of European judges who were tasked with determining
what weight to assign different forms of electronic evidence found
that "the person in charge of gathering electronic evidence is the fac205. See G. Daniel Lassiter, Illusory Causation in the Courtroom, 11 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. Sci. 204, 204 (2002) (citing to research done by Koffka in 1935,
showing that when sitting in a darkened room, people consistently attributed the growing
gap between two pinpoints of light to be caused by the light they were watching, regardless
of which of the lights was actually moving, KURT KOFFKA, PRINCIPLES OF GESTALT
PSYCHOLOGY (1935)).
206. G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Videotaped Interrogationsand Confessions: A Simple
Change in Camera Perspective Alters Verdicts in Simulated Trials, 87 J. APPLID PSYCHOL.
867, 868 (2002). See also Michael D. Storms, Videotape and the Attribution Process:
Reversing Actors' and Observers' Points of View, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 165
(1973); Jennifer J. Ratcliff et al., Camera Perspective Bias in Videotaped Confessions:
Experimental Evidence ofIts PerceptualBasis, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 197 (2006).
207. G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Evaluating Videotaped Confessions: Expertise Provides
No Defense Against the Camera-PerspectiveEffect, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 224, 224 25 (2007).
208.

See id. at 225.

209.

See id. at 224.

210.

See ICC Rules of Procedure, supra note 194, Rule 63(2).
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tor that influences most the evidential value attributed to it." 2 11 This
is consistent with the jurisprudence that has come out of the ICC to
date, where the judges have looked to the credibility of the source as
they assess evidence gathered by third-parties. 2 12 And it illustrates
again just how difficult it may be for the Court to accept usergenerated evidence taken by a user who wishes to remain anonymous. Indeed, even for users who are willing to be identified, it may
often be hard for many of them to achieve the same kind of credibility, in the eyes of the court, as long-standing INGOs with a welldocumented methodology and a track record of providing impartial
information.
3. Unintended Consequences
Once footage is admitted into evidence, there is no guarantee
that it will be interpreted in the way that the user intended. Notwithstanding intuitions that video footage will speak for itself, cognitive
science clearly shows that interpretation is in the eye of the beholder. 213
In addition to the impact of visual bias, video footage is also
mediated by the legal construction placed on it by the parties. To
take just the most high-profile example of this, when the prosecution
in the Rodney King case introduced video footage of police officers
beating King they did not imagine that the footage would be used by
the defense to help exonerate the officers. 2 14 As Professor Lawrence
Douglas concluded in his analysis of the use of video footage at Nuremberg, "in a trial, even evidence that claims to speak for itself of
atrocity ultimately must be spoken for. The legal meaning of such
evidence must be secured even as what it shows cannot be denied. 2 15
Once user-generated evidence comes into court, there is nothing to say that it will not be used to the advantage of the defense.
And while this is entirely appropriate from a legal standpoint, the
question again is if this is what the user understood to be a possibility
211.

CYBEX, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONIC IN COURT: FIGHTING AGAINST HIGH-

TECH CRIME 39 (2006), https://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/WSIS/3rd-meeting-docs/
contributions/libro-aeec en.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5CX-EAC8].
212.

See supra notes 177 179 and accompanying text.

213.

See, e.g., Kahan et al., supranote 24.

214. See Stuart, supra note 30, at 327 ("[B]aton blows and punches were re-narrated [by
the defense] and transformed into warranted officer conduct.").
215.

Douglas, supra note 31, at481.
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when they took risks to record the footage. Of course, users have
every right to take enormous risks to record. But the choice to do so
should be one that is informed by an accurate understanding of the
ends the footage may serve.
While filming, a user risks onsite retaliation. But threats to
the user's security do not end once their footage makes it to trial.
Even for users who uploaded their footage on the basis of being able
to maintain their anonymity, there is always the possibility that a motivated defense team will be able to uncover their identity. A defendant who appears in the footage may be able to identify the person
who was filming, or bystanders to the scene may have noticed someone holding out their phone. Indeed, with respect to the abovementioned intermediary whose identity the prosecution initially refused to disclose to the defense during the Lubanga trial, the defense
discovered the intermediary's identity regardless, well in advance
216 of
the prosecution ultimately deciding to disclose that information.
These security risks do not necessarily end at the conclusion
of the trial. Even if a defendant is convicted, that defendant's allies
may be motivated to try to find the person who gathered evidence
that helped secure a conviction. And as with more traditional forms
of evidence, users who have agreed to be identified as the source of
user-generated evidence may face retaliation against themselves,
their family, or their community in the aftermath
of a trial, regardless
217
of whether the defendant is found guilty.

IV. THE WAY FORWARD
Individuals are gathering user-generated evidence in conflictaffected areas around the world. And there are reasons to be optimistic about this new reality. User-generated evidence may democratize
the investigatory space and help preserve evidence that would otherwise be lost or destroyed. But given the risks identified above, there
are also reasons to be worried.
Part III identified recurring concerns that can be usefully
grouped into three broad categories: (i) user security, (ii) evidentiary
bias, and (iii) fair trial rights. The way that lawyers and judges respond to each of these categories will be crucial to determining the
216.

See Buisman, supra note 51, at 59.

217.

See, e.g., PHIL CLARK & NICOLA PALMER, TESTIFYING TO GENOCIDE: VICTIM AND

WITNESS

PROTECTION IN RWANDA 24-29

(2012), http://www.redress.org/wp-content/

uploads/2018/01/oct-12-Testifying-to-Genocide-Rwanda.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L9EGDAMD] (describing threats in retaliation against those who testified in local Gacaca trials).
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impact that user-generated evidence will have on international criminal justice. But in the remaining part of the Article I address, as a
prescriptive matter, only the first of these categories-user security.
This is because it is the one concern that is unique to the introduction
of user-generated evidence and, as a result, no attention has yet been
given to how to remedy it. By contrast, concerns about evidentiary
bias and fair trial rights, while equally important in determining the
impact of user-generated evidence, have been extensively covered in
the existing literature, thus providing a wealth of suggestions that
could2 18 usefully be transposed to the user-generated evidence context.
Security risks to users-and potentially their families and
communities-are inherent in the role of evidence collection and are
present to some degree no matter how many precautions a user takes.
But these risks can, and should, be mitigated. Users calibrate their
risk-taking to their expectations about what purpose their footage will
serve. The greater their expectations, the more risks they are likely to
be willing to take.
The following section makes an initial effort to survey what
options are available to reduce security risks to the user, to minimize
the likelihood that the user will overestimate the chance that their
footage will be used to achieve legal accountability, and, crucially, to
increase clarity about who is responsible if these efforts fail. I look
first to the role of contracts and then to the role of guidelines. In the
interests of providing a concrete example, I present the survey in relation to user-generated evidence that ends up at the ICC. However,
both contracts and guidelines could be adopted in situations where
user-generated evidence is submitted to other courts.
The use of contracts holds promise, but it is at best a partial
solution as it will not always be feasible to form a contract with a
given user. When the formation of a contract is not an option, I consider what role guidelines can play as a safety net. While they lack
the legally binding force of a contract, written guidelines can provide
218. See, e.g., Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND.
L.J. 1333, 1359 (describing "numerous potentially promising approaches" to minimize the
impact of camera perspective bias and illusory causation, including urging courts not to use
video evidence in a conclusory manner, and only allowing footage that is filmed from an
equal-focus (alleged perpetrator and alleged victim) perspective); Charles C. Jalloh & Amy
DiBella, Equality of Arms in International Criminal Law: Continuing Challenges, in THE
ASHGATE

RESEARCH

COMPANION

TO

INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

LAW-CRITICAL

PERSPECTIVES 251, 279 82 (Yvonne McDermott & William Schabas eds., 2013) (arguing
that the existing inequality of arms could be alleviated by courts pushing States to allow
defense investigator access); id. at 283 86 (arguing that equality of arms concerns require
stronger enforcement of the prosecution's disclosure obligations).
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a level of clarity currently lacking in the new investigative ecosystem. In terms of specifics, I consider two existing sets of guidelines:
the ICC Guidelines on the Use of Intermediaries and the ICRC
Guidelines on Protection Actors. But looking to these guidelines represents only the very beginning of what a fuller exploration should
involve; guidelines from other areas-including user-generated content in journalism, 2 19 crisis mapping, 22° and other ICT efforts-may
also contain directives that could be applied to the context of usergenerated evidence. And, encouragingly, an effort to develop guide22 1
lines on open-source evidence more generally is already underway.
A. Contracts
In considering the role of contracts, I draw on Professor Laura
Dickinson's insight that contracts can be a way of getting private actors to follow norms that apply to public actors, 2 2 2 thus playing a so223
called "publicization" function.
Of relevance here is Dickinson's
acknowledgment that not only private for-profit organizations, but
also nonprofit INGOs, have increasingly been used to take on public
functions in the international arena. 224
Dickinson's argument in favor of the use of contracts is that
they can encourage private actors to take on the values of a public
organization through contract provisions, including self-evaluation,
training, and monitoring. 225 The creation of a contract in no way
219. See, e.g., ONA Social Newsgathering Ethics Code, ONLINE NEWS NAT'L ASS'N,
https://toolkit.journalists.org/social-newsgathering/ [https://perma.cc/HT4K-9SY4].
220. See, e.g., Ethics in the Use of ICT in Development Projects: An Interview with
Jennifer Chan, https://bestict4d.wordpress.com/tag/ethics/[https://perma.cc/6ZXD-HFPJ].
221.

U.C.BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS CTR, THE NEW FORENSICS: USING

OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION TO NVESTIGATE GRAVE CRIMES 13 (2017), http://www.law.

berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Bellagio-report-2018_9.pdf
[https://perma.
cc/FRW8-UZJD] (recommending the production of guidelines "to support the improved
quality of open source investigations for legal accountability").
222. See Laura A. Dickinson, Governmentfor Hire: PrivatizingForeignAffairs and the
Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 135, 199
(2005).
223. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1285 (2003) (stating that, as first defined by Freeman, the term
"publicization" refers to the idea that it is possible to get private actors to take on public
norms).
224. See Dickinson, supra note 222, at 154 56 (discussing government outsourcing of
foreign aid to NGOs).
225. Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT'L L.
383, 403 23 (2006) (describing how contracts would require private actors to live up to
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guarantees this outcome, 226 and Dickinson herself identifies the risk
that "the added costs of compliance and oversight may .. . swallow
the purported benefits of privatization in the first place."
Nonetheless, the current situation for users could be improved upon as a result of two different types of contracts. The first is a contract between the ICC and the INGO responsible for outreach about usergenerated evidence collection, such as the IBA or WITNESS; the
second type of contract is between the ICC and the user.
1. ICC-INGO Contracts
This first type of contract would be a way for the Court to
help ensure that users are not taking risks on the basis of false expectations about whether and how their footage will be used by the
Court. While the two organizations behind the user-generated evidence apps that are currently on the market are trying to reduce the
risk of unmet expectations in their outreach programs, the situation
for users going forward cannot be left to the good faith of these organizations. There is nothing to prevent other organizations entering
this market in the future, and-in the absence of a contract or similar
mechanism-no guarantee that such organizations will follow the
practices that the IBA and WITNESS have been trying to develop.
A contract between an arm of the ICC 2 2 8 and an INGO, or
other private actor doing outreach to users, could draw on the existing model contract and associated code of conduct that the Court already uses with some of its intermediaries. Indeed, the analogy between these INGOs and intermediaries seems appropriate since the
function of both is to connect Court officials to evidence.
Any contract would need to address the two major concerns
previously identified: user security and the realistic management of
user expectations. In terms of security, the OTP should, at a minimum, require that INGO interactions with users operate under the
principle of harm minimization, and that all INGOs receive training
public law values through requirements such as self-evaluation, training, and monitoring).
226. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the
New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1229, 1270 (2003) (describing failures of contract
oversight by entities ranging from the U.S. Department of Defense to the University of
California Los Angeles).
227.

Dickinson, supra note 222, at 207.

228. For reasons discussed above, this is, at the present time, most likely to be the OTP.
See supra Part III.A.2. But there is no inherent reason why defense counsel or, in the ICC's
case, counsel for victims could not contract with an INGO doing outreach to gather usergenerated evidence.
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229
on the Court's Guidelines on Good Practices on Risk Prevention.
In terms of expectations management, the OTP could usefully
draw from the language in its existing Code of Conduct for Intermediaries to specify that an INGO doing outreach on user-generated evidence "shall not make commitments to ... potential) witnesses ...
that he/she/it is not in a position to fulfil."2 3 This would mean INGOs could not promise anonymity to users unless or until the first
case involving user-generated evidence establishes that the Court will
accept the idea of users staying anonymous. The contract could also
require INGOs to be explicit with users about the fact that material
they record may not ever be used by the ICC and, if used, will be
available to both defense and prosecution.
Compliance with these and other provisions could be secured
by requiring the INGOs to submit regular self-evaluations to the
Court, as well as sending Court staff to monitor the INGO's outreach
work where possible. Such approaches are not foolproof, but a provision stating that the OTP will not rely on user-generated evidence
secured on the contractor's app if any provision of the contract is violated would serve as a strong incentive for INGOs to comply.

2. ICC-User Contracts
Consideration of a second type of contract-between the
Court and the user-necessarily comes with a degree of uncertainty
because it depends on how the ICC judges decide to characterize user-generated evidence. If they accept the argument that a usergenerated evidence app is a witness, then the user who recorded the
footage is best analogized to an intermediary-someone who has
helped the Court gain access to a witness. If, on the other hand, the
judges require the authenticating testimony of a user to admit the
video into evidence, then that user is best analogized to a witness.
If the Court views a user as a witness, then the user can be

229. See e.g., INT'L CRIM. CT., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INTERMEDIARIES § 5.2 (2014)
[hereinafter ICC Intermediaries Code], https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/It/CCI-Eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8TGP-DXT4] ("An Intermediary shall ensure that in any dealings with a
person with whom the Intermediary has contact in the course of his/her/its Functions, the
potential for harm to the contacted person is minimised."); id. § 5.3 (requiring the
intermediary to operate in a "manner that limits the risks to any person with whom the
Intermediary has contact in the course of his/her/its Functions, especially when those risks
arise in connection with the Intermediary's Functions" and, in doing so, "observe the
Guidelines on Good Practiceson Risk Prevention").
230.

Id. § 6.3.
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brought within the Court's existing witness protection scheme.
While, as noted above, this scheme has significant flaws, bringing a
user under its rubric would at least mean than an individual is no
worse off from a security perspective on account of having recorded
user-generated evidence than they would have been if they had testified to the Court directly about what they had witnessed.
The great hope of those involved in developing usergenerated evidence apps, however, is that judges will accept the app
itself as the witness. After all, the purpose of building so much
metadata into the app design is to enable the evidence recorded on
the app to be self- authenticating. If this is the path that the judges
take, then a user is better analogized to an intermediary and would
therefore not automatically fall within the Court's witness protection
scheme. This, then, is the scenario in which an ICC-user contract
could be beneficial.
As explained above, there is precedent for the establishment
of a contract between the ICC and an intermediary. And once someone is formally acknowledged by the Court as an intermediary in this
way, then the Court has a degree of responsibility for that intermediary's security. The Court's responsibility is a subsidiary one. Per the
model contract between the ICC and an intermediary, the primary responsibility for the intermediary's security lies with the intermediary
itself.23 2 But under the Court's Guidelines on the Use of Intermediaries, if "the performance of the functions of an intermediary creates
security risks to the intermediary, the Court must take measures to
manage those risks," up to and including the use of protective
measures. 233 Beyond the issue of security, a contract between the
ICC and a user that follows the model contract would also reinforce
the stipulations in a contract between the ICC and an INGO regarding the requirements that intermediaries inform the user about the
risk of their identity being exposed, 234 and that they make no repre-

231.

See supra note 137 and accompanying text.

232.

See INT'L CRIM. CT., MODEL CONTRACT FOR INTERMEDIARIES,

Art. 8 (2014)

[hereinafter Model Contract for Intermediaries], https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/It/MCIEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/97NE-H6HY] (specifying that the intermediary must take actions
to safeguard his or her own security and immediately notify the court of any security threat).
233. INT'L CRIM. CT., GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COURT AND
INTERMEDIARIES 17 (2014) [hereinafter ICC Intermediaries Guidelines], https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/It/GCRI-Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY83-B9FM].
234. Model Contract for Intermediaries, Art. 10 ("The intermediary acknowledges and
agrees that the Court (or the Counsel) may disclose his/her/its identity when and if requested
to do so by the relevant judicial authority in charge of the respective judicial procedure.").
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sentations to the user that cannot be fulfilled.2 35 Unfortunately, however, the Court does not generally
contract with "self-appointed" or
"one-off' intermediaries, 36 which is likely to be an accurate characterization of most users.
B. Guidelines
The formation of contractual relationships between some of
the actors in the new investigatory ecosystem mapped out in Part II
may be a "first best" option, but, as with "self-appointed" intermediaries mentioned above, it will not be possible in all cases. Thus, written guidelines, while not legally binding, could serve as a backstop
and provide clarity about which actors are responsible for reducing
risks to users (as well as what users are themselves responsible for).
1. ICC Guidelines on the Use of Intermediaries
The ICC Guidelines on the Use of Intermediaries were responsive to the Court's concern about the OTP's (mis)use of intermediaries in the Lubanga case. 237 Under the definition provided in
the guidelines, intermediaries include those who "assist a party or
participant to conduct investigations by identifying evidentiary leads
and/or witnesses and facilitating contact with potential witnesses. ' 238
Thus, if the Court determines that a user-generated evidence app is
self-authenticating, then users can plausibly be described as intermediaries.
Not all intermediaries automatically fall within the Guidelines; those who have entered into a contractual relationship with an
organ of the Court do, but for those operating outside a contractual
relationship, "a determination [of their coverage under the Guidelines] shall be made on a case-by-case basis."2
This would leave
most users in a position of uncertainty. A preferable approach would
be for the Court to make a formal determination, ideally in advance
of the al-Wefalli trial, that any user whose footage is used at any
stage of the legal process falls within the Guidelines.
235.

ICC Intermediaries Code, supra note 229, § 6.3.

236.

Id. § 194.

237. See supra Part I. The current guidelines were "revisited after the 14 March 2012
Lubanga judgment to ensure they addressed the concerns raised by Trial Chamber I." ICC
Intermediaries Guidelines, supra note 233, at 4.
238.

Id. at 6.

239.

Id.
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Making a categorical determination in relation to users whose
footage the Court relies on would be a marked improvement in the
security situation for users. The Guidelines stress the responsibility
of the intermediary-in this case, a user-to take precautions for
their own safety (alongside a concurrent responsibility for the Court
to avoid putting the user's safety at risk). But when these measures
nonetheless fail to protect the user, then the Guidelines stipulate that
"appropriate protective measures shall be implemented [by the
Court] .,24o

2. ICRC Protection Guidelines
The ICRC Protection Guidelines were revised in 2013 to account for advances in ICT. 241 While the Guidelines are targeted toward human rights and humanitarian protection actors, they seek also
to be "a source of inspiration
to all those who seek to have a positive
,,242
impact on protection.
Specifically, they state that the Guidelines
"will also be of interest to people who do not necessarily see themselves as protection actors, such as people working in social media,
or people setting up crisis mapping independently from traditional
humanitarian and human rights organizations."24 3 In the next revision of the Guidelines, INGOs who do outreach on user-generated
evidence could, and should, be incorporated into this list.
The Guidelines address the handling of sensitive information,
and highlight several risks that are particularly germane to the collection of user-generated evidence. These include: "The risk of raising
false expectations that there will be a rapid response or in fact any response at all ... [and] the inability of people who have had little or

no... experience with modern information technology to give real

240.

Id. at 14 (emphasis added).

241.

INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS

FOR PROTECTION

WORK 4 (2013), http://www.shop.icrc.org/professional-standards-for-protection-workcarried-out-by-humanitarian-and-human-rights-actors-in-armed-conflict-and-othersituations-of-violence-2540 [https://perma.cc/WYE8-L78L]. ("In light of the rapidly
proliferating initiatives to make new uses of information technology for protection purposes,
such as satellite imagery, crisis mapping and publicizing abuses and violations through
social media, the advisory group agreed to review the scope and language of the standards
on managing sensitive information. The revised standards reflect the experiences and good
practices of humanitarian and human rights organizations as well as of information and
communication technology actors.").
242.

Id. at5.

243.

Id. at 81.
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informed consent.

244

The Guidelines seek to mitigate these risks. One directive
states that "[i]nformation that is not necessary for the purpose identified prior to, or at the time of collection, should simply not be collected, in order to avoid unnecessary risks ... or false expectations

on the part of those providing the information." 245 Adherence to this
in the user-generated evidence context would require INGOs doing
outreach on user-generated evidence to be very clear about the kind
of footage that a criminal investigation is likely to find useful. It
would ensure that the sort of training guidance presenting in
WITNESS's Video as Evidence manual, emphasizing the importance
of linkage evidence in investigations, becomes the standard for other
organizations seeking to enter this space in the future.
Another directive of relevance is that "[p]rotection actors
must integrate the notion of informed consent when calling upon the
general public, or members of a community, to spontaneously send
them information. ,,246 Compliance with this provision would ensure
that INGOs think through how to explain the potential risks and benefits involved in recording on their apps before doing outreach.
Of course, INGOs are not legally required to follow these, or
any other, guidelines. But Courts seeking to use user-generated evidence in their investigations and proceedings could establish a norm
of getting INGOs to do so by stipulating that they will only accept
user-generated evidence gathered through organizations that adhere
to these guidelines. The hope is that the better-informed users are
about the costs and benefits of gathering evidence, the better decisions they will make about their own security.
CONCLUSION

Across the globe, people are using their smartphones to gather
evidence, and there is no indication that they will stop doing so anytime soon. This Article identified the emergence of user-generated
evidence, mapped the new actors, roles, and inter-relationships that
this kind of evidence brings to the investigatory ecosystem, and distilled three categories of concern arising from this development: user
security, evidentiary bias, and fair trial rights. The question going
forward is not whether users should gather evidence, but rather, what
244.

Id. at 82.

245.

Id. at 88.

246.

Id. at 95.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[57:1

can be done to mitigate the problems that arise when they do?
One of the perceived advantages of bringing user-generated
evidence into international criminal investigations is that of risk reduction. To the degree that user-generated evidence can stand in
place of evidence collected by traditional methods, court investigators will have to make fewer trips to conflict-ridden locations, thereby reducing risks to themselves and those they interact with. But in
reality, the turn to user-generated evidence may more accurately be
described as risk-shifting, rather than risk-reduction. User-generated
evidence certainly enables international lawyers to obtain hard-toaccess evidence at no risk to themselves. But if the risk associated
with evidence collection does not disappear so much as get transferred-from professionals backed by an international court to individual users with no such institutional safety net-then the turn toward user-generated evidence is harder to justify. As has so often
been the case with new technology, user-generated evidence apps
may serve to merely replicate, rather than transform, existing power
hierarchies.24 7
The INGOs currently doing outreach about user-generated evidence are working diligently to try to do the right thing by users.
However, simply hoping not only that these organizations will continue to do so but also that organizations entering this space in the future will act in the same way is not a plan for mitigating the very serious risks identified in this article.
Many of the concerns that user-generated evidence raises are
not novel; bias, fair trial rights, and security of witnesses, if not users,
have long been part of the landscape of international criminal investigations. But user-generated evidence is entering this landscape at a
time when, relying on traditional evidentiary approaches, the ICC is
struggling to put on a successful trial. This heightens the risk that the
more pernicious aspects of user-generated evidence will be overlooked in the service of boosting courtroom activity. It is not too farfetched to imagine case-selection being driven, to a greater or lesser
extent, by the availability of user-generated evidence-raising the
specter of justice being ultimately led away from those places and
events that are inherently less susceptible to capture on a smartphone.
Those involved in the project of international criminal justice
may only fully appreciate the significance of this current momentimmediately before user-generated evidence enters an international
courtroom for the first time-in hindsight. Regardless, it is incumbent upon those who support the project of international criminal jus-

247.

See Sharp, supra note 98, at 69 87.
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tice to begin addressing the concerns raised in this Article as a matter
of priority. The decisions we make in the very near future will determine whether user-generated evidence has a positive impact, or if
it merely promises to address some current problems with international criminal investigations, only at the expense of shifting security
concerns from investigators to users, creating new forms of evidentiary bias, and entrenching the existing inequality of arms in international criminal law.

